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Earned Citizenship:
Property Lessons for Immigration Reform
Ayelet Shachar*
I. INTRODUCTION
At the heart of contemporary immigration debates lies a fundamental
tension between the competing visions of "a nation of laws" and that of "a
nation of immigrants." This is particularly evident in the American
context.' The nation-of-laws camp maintains that people who have
breached the country's immigration law by entering without permission
(or overstaying their initial visa) cannot overcome this "original sin," even
if they have lived on its territory peacefully and productively for decades
thereafter.2 The nation-of-immigrants milieu counters by reminding us
* 02011 Ayelet Shachar; Professor of Law, Political Science & Global Affairs; holder of the Canada
Research Chair in Citizenship and Multiculturalism, University of Toronto. Comments are welcome:
ayelet.shachar@utoronto.ca. The first draft of this Article was written during my appointment as the
Jeremiah Smith Jr., Visiting Professor of Law at Harvard Law School. Many friends and colleagues
have generously commented on earlier versions. I would like to extend my particular thanks to Yochai
Benkler, Joseph Singer, Martha Minow, Gerald Neuman, Jana Singer, Laura Kessler, Mark Graber,
Michael Van Alstine, Hiroshi Motomura, Patrick Weil, Cristina Rodriguez, Sigal Ben-Porath, Scott
Shapiro, Heather Greken, Tracey Meares, Daniel Markovits, Akhil Amar, Paul Kahn, Reva Siegel,
Bruce Ackerman, Rogers Smith, and especially Ran Hirschl for insightful comments and
conversations. The Article also benefited greatly from the research and editorial assistance of Jeremy
Landau, Kate Brookson-Morris, Jonathan Schachter, and Victoria McCaffrey. Previous versions were
presented at Harvard Law School, the Berkeley Center for the Study of Law & Society at Boalt Hall,
the University of Toronto Legal Theory Workshop, the University of Maryland Faculty Workshop,
and the Yale Legal Theory Workshop.
1. The literature on America as a "nation of immigrants" is too vast to cite. Notable contributions
include John F. Kennedy's posthumously published NATION OF IMMIGRANTS (1964); ALEJANDRO
PORTES AND RUBEN G. RUMBAUT, IMMIGRANT AMERICA: A PORTRAIT (3d ed. 2006); ARISTIDE R.
ZOLBERG, A NATION BY DESIGN: IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE FASHIONING OF AMERICA (2006);
PETER H. SCHUCK, CITIZENS, STRANGERS, AND IN-BETWEENS: ESSAYS ON IMMIGRATION AND
CITIZENSHIP (1998); OSCAR HANDLIN, THE UPROOTED: THE EPIC STORY OF THE GREAT MIGRATIONS
THAT MADE THE AMERICAN PEOPLE (1st ed. 1951) (opening with the following statement: "Once I
thought to write a history of the immigrants in America. Then I discovered that immigrants were
America."). Historically, the nation of laws argument gained prominence in the late 19th century,
culminating in influence in the 1920s, which saw a basic shift in the nation's immigration policy with
the enactment of restrictive federal immigration laws and the assignment of quotas based on national
origin. These were only removed in 1965. For an overview of these legislative changes, see generally
EDWARD HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAW, 1798-1965 (1981);
LAURENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (3d ed. 2005).
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that immigration is a vital component of the national self-definition of
immigrant-receiving societies such as the United States, Canada,
Australia, and New Zealand-the "flesh of our flesh," as noted historian
Bernard Weisberger once put it.3
For illustrative purposes, this Article will focus on the United States,
which annually accepts the largest intake of immigrants in the world.' No
less significant, the United States is currently in the midst of an
acrimonious debate over immigration reform. Canada, too, might see
similar debates erupt in the future given the rise of temporary workers'
admissions that have skyrocketed in recent years.s If some of these
temporary entrants remain beyond the terms of their initial visa, Canada
might witness the establishment of a population that settles in the country
for years yet remains prohibited from the protection of citizenship, for the
regulations that govern the initial admission are specifically designed to
bar the option of ascendance to citizenship and the fundamental
protections (such as those against deportation) that come with it.
In terms of policy framing, the nation-of-immigrants position
challenges the nation-of-laws perspective that certain entrants to a country
should not be set on the road to citizenship. In today's immigration battles
in the United States, it also focuses on finding a path to regularize the
status of long-term resident non-citizens, an especially significant project
given the estimated ten to twelve million undocumented migrants already
in the country.6 Many of those in the United States without status have
U.S.-born citizen children who possess a legal right to remain in the
fact, it predates it, appearing in the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, Article XXX: "In the
government of this commonwealth, the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and
judicial powers, or either of them: the executive shall never exercise the legal and judicial powers, or
either of them: the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them:
to the end it may a government of laws and not of men." This phrase is credited to John Adams who
published articles referring to it in 1774 in the Boston Gazette under the pseudonym "Novanglus" and
then of course had a hand in drafting the Massachusetts Constitution in 1779. See JOHN ADAMS,
Novanglus Papers, No. 7 IN 4 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 106, 230 (Charles Francis Adams ed.,
1851).
3. See Bernard A. Weisberger, A Nation oflmmigrants, 45 AM. HERITAGE Feb.-Mar. 1994.
4. Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have higher per-capita rates but lower absolute admission
numbers. The foreign-born population in the United States as of 2007 accounts for approximately
13.6 percent of the population, 20.1 percent in Canada, 25 percent in Australia, and 21.6 percent in
New Zealand. See OECD.ORG, OECD in Figures 2009,
http://browse.oecdbookshop.org/oecd/pdfs/browseit/0109061E.PDF (last visited Oct. 31, 2010) at 6-7.
5. In recent years, the Canadian temporary workers program (TFWP) has grown exponentially;
Canada now accepts more temporary foreign workers than permanent residents ("landed immigrants")
on an annual basis.. See News Release, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Canada Welcomes a
Record High Number of Newcomers in 2008 (Feb. 20, 2009) available at
http://ww.cic.gc.ca/english/department/media/releases/2009/2009-02-20.asp.
6. I use the terms "undocumented," "unauthorized" and "irregular" migrants interchangeably
throughout this Article to refer to the situation of persons who either entered in breach of immigration
laws or overstayed their initial visas.
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country.' This makes the prospect of tearing up families and deporting
them en masse as bleak as it is impractical.' Senator Charles Schumer,
Chairman of the Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, made this point
succinctly: although "people are strongly against illegal immigration, they
are also just as strongly against turning their country into a 'roundup
republic."'" While both sides generally agree on the latter, the main bone
of contention between them is the terms of response to the former.
The nation-of-laws stance on this matter is firm and relies on an
intuitive appeal: if unlawful admission (or unauthorized overstay) is
wrong, then "why should people who violated the law be given an
opportunity 'of converting to legal status and earning a path to
citizenship'?' 0 Other proponents of this approach go further, arguing that
such legalization or "[a]mnesty undermines the rule of law. In the first
encounter these people had with our country, they broke our law.""
Although bearing moral force, this position's Achilles' heel is its
reluctance to see anything beyond the first encounter. It also displays a
want of viable alternatives, assuming (as I think we should) that a
"roundup republic" option is both unrealistic and undesirable. Under the
incumbent situation, "[migrant] workers who seek only to earn a living
end up in the shadows of American life-fearful, often abused and
exploited. When they are victimized by crime, they are afraid to call the
police, or seek recourse in the legal system." 2 Many, including
government officials, have declared this situation "wrong" and "not the
American way."' 3
7. See RICHARD FRY & JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC CENTER LATINO CHILDREN: A
MAJORITY ARE U.S. BORN OFFSPRING OF IMMIGRANTS, (May 28, 2009), available at
http://pewhispanic.org/reports/report.php?ReportlD=1 10; JEFFERY S. PASSEL & PAUL TAYLOR, PEW
HISPANIC CENTER, UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANTS AND THEIR U.S.-BORN CHILDREN , (Aug. 11, 2010),
available at http://pewhispanic.org/reports/report.php?repostlD=125. Nearly 1 in 10 American
families are of mixed immigration status: at least one parent is a non-citizen, and one child a citizen.
An estimated four million U.S. citizen children have at least one parent who is an undocumented
immigrant.
8. See Mary Lyndon Shanley, Enable Citizen Children To Keep Their Families Together, BOS.
REV. May-June 2009 (arguing in favor of allowing children citizens to be raised by their immigrant
parents rather than live in a household in which the threat of deportation is ever-present).
9. See Senator Charles Schumer, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Immigration,
Refugees, and Border Security, Remarks for 6th Annual Immigration Law and Policy Conference,
Migration Policy Institute (Washington, D.C., June 24, 2009).
10. See FEDERAL FOR AMERICAN IMMIGRATION REFORM, FAIR'S RESPONSE TO SEN. CHARLES
SCHUMER'S SEVEN POINT PLAN FOR SO-CALLED "COMPREHENSIVE IMMIGRATION REFORM" (June 25,
2009), available at http://www.fainus.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=20841.
11. Mark Krikorian, Amnesty Again: This Country Should Have Learned-Apparently, It Has
Not, NATIONAL REVIEW (Jan. 26, 2004).
12. See KEVIN JOHNSON, OPENING THE FLOODGATES: WHY AMERICA NEEDS TO RETHINK ITS
BORDERS AND IMMIGRATION LAWS 187 (2007) (citing George W. Bush in a White House Press
Release dated Jan. 7, 2004).
13. See, e.g., Fact Sheet: Fair and Secure Immigration Reform (White House, Jan. 7, 2004)
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The nation-of-immigrants perspective has a ready-made and potent
response to these types of observations. According to its proponents, if
America is to remain an open and welcoming nation, it must create a path
for undocumented migrants to emerge from the shadows and gain legal
status as part of a comprehensive-and humane-immigration reform
project. This position is supported by a wide range of civil society,
immigrant, labor, and interfaith organizations.14 Alas, an emphasis on
compassion and human dignity is unlikely to convince the hard line
restrictionists that make up a section of the nation-of-laws bloc. They
view any such concession as rewarding lawbreakers with "the most
coveted asset on the planet-permanent residence in the United States."
Thus we are back to square one in this ideological standoff. The nation-
of-laws and nation-of-immigrants positions appear irreconcilable, a
dangerous prospect given the momentous social and political
ramifications implicated in this tremendously high-stakes debate.
This Article proposes a way out of this stalemate, setting out a new
theoretical framework that emphasizes the importance of rootedness as a
basis for legal title. For those barred from legal membership under
traditional principles of citizenship acquisition, the rootedness framework
offers a path for earned citizenship arising from the existence of already
established, real, and genuine ties toward the political community. The
idea of emphasizing actual, continuous, and peaceful presence on a
territory as the basis for legal title is here drawn primarily from property
theory and doctrine.16 Despite the centrality of rootedness in these core
legal arenas, this concept has not gained similar traction in present
debates over immigration. This is an oversight that this Article seeks to
address.
The idea of taking root as a basis for earning entitlement has been
familiar to the common-law tradition for centuries. It was brilliantly
captured in Oliver Wendell Holmes' resounding words: "a thing which
exploitation. Workers risk their lives in dangerous and illegal border crossing and are consigned to
live their lives in the shadows.")
14. Statements in support of regularization have been made by numerous organizations
including: the US Chamber of Commerce, the American Federation of Labor, United Farm Workers,
the Asian Pacific American Labor Alliance, the New School's Center for Migration, Ethnicity and
Citizenship, the National Immigration Forum, the National Association of Manufacturers, and the
American Immigration Lawyers Association. In addition, the Interfaith Immigration Coalition, an
alliance of more than 50 religious based organizations, has called on Congress to create a legalization
path for unauthorized migrants, see INTERFAITH STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF COMPREHENSIVE
IMMIGRATION REFORMS (updated Oct. 24, 2008) ("We, the undersigned faith-based leaders and
organizations, join together to call upon ... our elected officials in Congress to enact comprehensive
immigration reform legislation that establishes a safe and humane immigration system consistent with
our values."). See also Muzaffar Chisti & Claire Bergeron, Push for Comprehensive Immigration
Grows, but Several Obstacles Remain, MIGRATION POL'Y INST., Aug. 15, 2010.
15. Krikorian, Amnesty Again, supra note 11.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 51-81.
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you have enjoyed and used as your own for a long time, whether property
or opinion, takes root in your being . .. , however you came by it."l 7
Placing rootedness at center stage also fits with the growing recognition in
law (from modern contract to property theory, family law to private
international law) that changes in relationships and expectations over time
often can necessitate shifts in legal status. It further offers a concrete legal
method to fulfill the ideal of inclusive participation in a democratic
society." The emphasis on rootedness possesses yet another significant
advantage: it holds the key to overcoming the nation-of-laws versus
nation-of-immigrants standoff that has repeatedly frustrated attempts at
comprehensive immigration reform.
Counter-intuitively, I argue that the way out of the immigration
stalemate is to turn the restrictionists' argument on its head,
demonstrating that not only as a nation of immigrants but also as a nation
of laws there is an obligation to provide a venue for regularizing the status
of those who have already become part of the country's economic and
societal fabric. This rootedness approach emphasizes the importance of
real and established links to the community, which are externally
observable and legally identifiable, as a new root of title to citizenship for
those who already "practice" it. This framework has the benefit of relying
not just on considerations of goodwill or human compassion, as most
arguments in favor of legalization do. Instead, it adds a thus-far missing
analytical link that reveals an existing legal basis for defending a
regulated path to earned citizenship.
To address the main argument advanced by the nation-of-laws
opponents to regularization, namely, that "all of them who advocate for
[an earned path to citizenship] are undermining the rule of law,"' 9 this
Article employs the technique of reasoning by analogy. If we can
demonstrate that even in the realm of private property-the ultimate
Blackstonian bastion of "sole and despotic dominion"20-individuals who
initially resided on a property without permission can later gain legitimate
title to it under specified legal conditions, then a similar logic can apply
with at least equal force when the title at issue is a government-issued
new property-like good: namely, access to the public entitlement of
political membership, a state-dispensed good rather than a privately held
17. See THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES: SELECTION FROM THE LETTERS, SPEECHES, JUDICIAL OPINIONS
AND OTHER WRITINGS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 176 (Richard A. Posner, ed., 1992) [hereinafter
THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES]. Another strand of property theory emphasizes the personhood-constitutive
dimension of the relationship between individuals and property. See Margaret Jane Radin, Property
and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982).
18. See infra text accompanying notes 98-121.
19. See 153 CONG. REc., Oct. 23, 2007 (statement of Rep. King of Iowa).
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chattel. 21 This permits us to see earned citizenship in a fresh light: not as a
handout or act of charity, but as a legal title that arises from the existence
of already-established, real, and genuine ties to the political community.
The emphasis on rootedness animates a new legal principle, jus nexi,
which I defend here as an auxiliary path for inclusion in the polity that
could operate alongside the established principles of citizenship
acquisition: by birth on the territory (jus soli, encoded in the 14th
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and the territorial birthright
provision of Canada's Citizenship Act) 22 or birth to a citizen parent (jus
sanguinis, established by statutory provisions for membership by
lineage).23 The jus nexi principle offers a remedy to some of the most
glaring inequalities of the current situation in which those who are
ineligible for a nation's citizenship according to traditional principles-
despite sharing in its society and economy-remain shut outside the
recognized circle of political members and are denied the basic security
and opportunity that is associated with full, legal membership.
The urgency of reform is undisputed. Almost everyone agrees that the
current immigration system in the United States is broken.24 To this we
must add the realization that in a world of increased cross-border
mobility, the traditional territorial (us soli) and parental (jus sanguinis)
principles for allotting membership no longer serve as sufficiently refined
predictors for determining who shall actually reside in "this or that
country." 25 This leads to significant problems of over- and under-
inclusion." My focus here is on the latter dimension, arguing that instead
21. See J.W. Harris, Private and Non-Private Property: What is the Difference? Ill L.Q. REV.
421 (1995). Of course there are many significant distinctions between private property and
citizenship's public entitlement; the former typically grants exclusivity to the title-holder and is
alienable and tradable, whereas the latter, by virtue of being a state-generated legal status is
nontradable and inalienable (with the caveat of voluntary expatriation). See generally Susan Rose-
Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 931 (1985) (on
inalienability). As I explain below, citizenship is more akin to a broad, social-relational conception of
property rather than a narrow, market-based one. See infra notes 74-81 and accompanying text.
22. Citizenship Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-29, s. 3(a) (Can.).
23. The statutory scheme governing the transfer of citizenship by parentage still bears residual
traces of gender inequality: it distinguishes between men and women in the transmission of
citizenship out of wedlock for a child born outside the United States. See Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S.
420 (1998); Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 52 (2001); United States v. Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d 990 (9 Cir.
2008), cert. granted, Flores-Villar v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1878 (U.S. Mar. 22, 2010) (No. 09-
5801).
24. See Demetrios G. Papdemetriou et. al. 1 MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE, HARNESSING THE
ADVANTAGES OF IMMIGRATION FOR A 21ST-CENTURY ECONOMY: A STANDING COMMISSION ON
LABOR MARKETS, ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS, AND IMMIGRATION (2009) ("It is now a clich6 in
the debate about US immigration policy to declare that the 'system is broken.' Such blanket
declarations go beyond illegal immigration and cut across all of the immigration system's main
components.").
25. See SEYLA BENHABIB, THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS: ALIENS, RESIDENTS AND CITIZENS 141
(2004) [hereinafter BENHABIB, THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS].
26. I have addressed these over- and under-inclusion concerns in detail in Children of a Lesser
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of merely focusing on the legalese of a person's immigration status, there
must be a point in time in which the nexuses between right and duty,
actual participation and membership status, social connectedness and
political voice, gain weight and sway. This shift in perspective enables the
development of a legal framework that accounts for actual, on-the-ground
(or "functional") ties that give rise to the jus nexi citizenship principle. I
call this new principle jus nexi because, like jus soli and jus sanguinis, it
communicates the core meaning of the method through which political
membership is conveyed: by connection, rootedness, or linkage.
The shift tojus nexi easily gains traction from the nation-of-immigrants
position's familiar ideal of offering a fresh start to newcomers. The
innovation of the rootedness argument lies, however, in its simultaneous
reliance on a quintessential nation-of-laws rationale: the idea that we must
have a rational and defensible legal system that determines who is (or
ought to be) defined as a rights-holder in the first place, and under what
conditions. This is what distinguishes right from might, the rule of law
from anarchy or tyranny. Without the provision of title and protection by
law, as Immanuel Kant famously observed, we are doomed to a life of
lawlessness where no one's freedom and liberty is ever secure.27 The
nation-of-laws argument thus can be "recovered" from the stronghold of
its current restrictionist and doctrinaire vein. It is here that the conceptual
borrowing from contemporary theory and jurisprudence in property
proves most helpful. It permits developing an equitable or remedial basis
for gaining political membership for those who cannot benefit from the
existing citizenship and immigration principles and remain barred from
naturalization under current law.28 The jus nexi principle offers an
improvement to the present setup: it accounts for the significance of an
immigrant's actual community membership and the social fact of her
attachment to the nation, rather than simply relying on the initial moment
of entry that fails to account for subsequent immersion and changed
expectations over time.
As I detail in the following pages, the rootedness framework
corresponds with the emergent emphasis on progressive or trusteeship
notions of property, requiring that we "look to the underlying human
values that property serves and the social relationships it shapes and
State: Sustaining Global Inequality through Citizenship Laws, in NOMOS: CHILD, FAMILY, AND
STATE 345-397 (Stephen Macedo & Iris Marion Young eds., 2003); AYELET SHACHAR, THE
BIRTHRIGHT LOTIERY: CITIZENSHIP AND GLOBAL INEQUALITY 111-33 (2009).
27. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Mary Gregor, tr.
1998). Invoking Kant here is restricted to the connection between the rule of law and property, rather
than endorsing his particular vision of property rights. This shift in perspective also allows for the
highlighting of notions of interdependence, acquiescence, and reliance, as well as the importance of
state action or omission in giving rise to a legal obligation.
28. See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898) (pronouncing that there are "two
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reflects." 29 It permits a revival of earlier scholarly attempts to cross-
fertilize notions of sovereignty with those of property, although my
analysis reverses the arrows: I use concepts found in property and related
private law fields to both inform and foster a discussion about the
possibilities for public law reform of citizenship and immigration
policy.30 Deploying the influential terminology coined by Charles Reich
almost half a century ago in his landmark article The New Property," this
Article demonstrates that citizenship itself has become a special kind of
"new property" that guarantees security and opportunity to those fortunate
enough to hold it. I also build upon my previous writings on the enduring
worth of political membership in today's world, which highlight the
global distributive implications of treating citizenship as a special kind of
inherited entitlement. 32 Here I turn my gaze to the domestic arena,
arguing that this framework of using analogous insights drawn from
property theory yields unexpected insights for our thinking about
membership in this context as well and provides the framework for
exploring some creative solutions.
While the argument I develop bears immediate policy implications for
contemporary debates in the United States, the analysis is intentionally
cast in broader terms. It draws upon a set of comparative and international
examples, as well as engaging with core insights from traditional common
law reasoning and contemporary political theory. This inquisitive method
permits us to shed fresh light on some of the oldest and most fraught
moral and legal dilemmas facing any immigrant-receiving nation:
defining who belongs, or ought to belong, within the circle of full
29. See Gregory S. Alexander et. al., A Statement of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV.
743 (2009) [hereinafter Alexander, Statement]. See also Kristen A. Carpenter et. al., In Defense of
Property, 118 YALE L.J. 1022 (2009) (defending a stewardship model of property).
30. In the early twentieth century, the critical attempt was to impose notions of public law and
accountability on private actors; a classic contribution in this vein is Morris R. Cohen, Property and
Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927). Today, we find a rich discussion that aims to bring
considerations of public good and human flourishing to the analysis of private property relations. See,
e.g., Alexander, Statement. Recent years have also witnessed attempts to explain the sovereign
prerogative of regulating borders as grounded in property theory. See, e.g., KURT BURCH, PROPERTY
AND THE MAKING OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM (1998); Anna Stilz, Why Do States Have
Territorial Rights? I INT'L THEORY 185 (2009) (distinguishing between Lockean and Kantian
accounts).
31. See Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). I should note that, whereas
Reich urged a reinterpretation of the Due Process Clause, my aim is more modest: I propose an
additional (remedial) venue for citizenship acquisition, which fully accepts and endorses the standard
interpretation of the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as bestowing membership to
any child born on the territory - with the narrow exception of those born to foreign diplomats. See,
e.g., GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND
FUNDAMENTAL LAW (1996). As I explain below, the dilemmas affecting undocumented students and
many other members of the "1.5 generation" arise in part from the fact that they cannot benefit from
the citizenship clause because they were brought into the country after birth.
32. See, e.g., SHACHAR, supra note 26; Ayelet Shachar & Ran Hirschl, Citizenship as Inherited
Property, 35 POL. THEORY 253 (2007).
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membership, and according to what criteria.33 My discussion proceeds in
three major steps. Part II portrays the human face of the present dilemma
of immigration reform. It highlights the case of young people without
status (the "1.5" generation) who were brought into the country by their
parents or guardians in breach of American immigration law, the situation
of those who overstayed the terms of their initial admission visa and,
finally, the most testing situation of all: those who entered without
permission but who have resided in the country for decades. Part III
develops the principle of jus nexi and its core implications by drawing
upon the rich body of property jurisprudence and contemporary
democratic theory, as well as reinvigorated definitions of membership in
the local and international arenas. Part IV turns to application and
institutional design, exploring some of the most contested policy arenas in
today's charged nation-of-laws versus nation-of-immigrants debate.
II. SNAPSHOTS: THE HUMAN TOLL OF THE IMMIGRATION STALEMATE
Each year, approximately 65,000 undocumented students who reside in
the United States without legal status graduate from high school in similar
circumstances: they have lived in the country for at least five years and
have received much of their primary and secondary education here.34
They were young babies or toddlers when brought to the United States by
a parent entering without permission or by a family overstaying the time-
limited period of a valid entry visa. In either case, the children, through no
choice or fault of their own, become categorized as unlawful or
undocumented migrants. The scholarly literature refers to these
individuals as members of the "1.5 generation": "[t]hey are not the first
generation because they did not choose to migrate, but neither do they
belong to the second generation because they were born and spent [a
33. I make this observation as a factual and empirical statement, based on the operation of
membership rules enforced by nation states in the real world around us. For those who argue in favor
of a normative global-cosmopolitan alternative, however, any legal regime that defines membership
as bounded (i.e., encompassing less than the whole world population) is perceived as falling short of
the ideal. There is a vast body of political and philosophical writings on these topics. Some of the
most influential accounts in this vein include: BENHABIB, THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS, supra note 25;
LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY MEMBERSHIP (2006)
[hereinafter BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN]; PHILLIP COLE, PHILOSOPHIES OF EXCLUSION:
LIBERAL THEORY AND IMMIGRATION (2000); CATHERINE DAUVERGNE, MAKING PEOPLE ILLEGAL:
WHAT GLOBALIZATION MEANS FOR MIGRATION AND LAW (2008); PETER J. SPIRO, BEYOND
CITIZENSHIP: AMERICAN IDENTITY AFTER GLOBALIZATION (2008); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF
JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 31-63 (1983); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, The
Tightening Circle of Membership, 22 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 915 (1994); Joseph H. Carens, Aliens and
Citizens: The Case for Open Borders, 49 REv. POL. 251 (1987); Jennifer Gordon, Transnational
Labor Citizenship, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 503 (2007).
34. See Roberto G. Gonzales, Wasted Talent and Broken Dreams: The Lost Potential of
Undocumented Migrants (Immigration Policy Center, D.C.) Oct. 2007, at 1; Jeffrey S. Passel, Further
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brief] part of their childhood outside the United States."" Under current
immigration law, there is no path to regularize their status.3 6 Many
members of the 1.5 generation "have been in this country almost their
entire lives and attended most of their K-12 education here."" Yet,
because they are in the country without legal status, "their day-to-day
lives are severely restricted and their futures are uncertain. They cannot
legally drive, vote, or work. Moreover, at any time, these young men and
women can be, and sometimes are, deported to countries they barely
know." 38
The stalemate that surrounds comprehensive immigration reform, with
its focus on the initial moment of entry, has not spared these "'innocent
young people'," as one congressman put it, "who came to America by no
choice of their own as children and [now] want to succeed in school and
make better lives for themselves and their families."" Under current
immigration law and policy, they are categorically excluded from
citizenship. Unlike adults who entered without permission, the case of the
1.5 generation is in principle easier to address because its members never
breached the law of their own volition. In today's poisoned environment,
however, the hardliners in the nation-of-laws camp oppose the
regularization of status even for this particular group, saying that it is "just
another amnesty reward for lawbreaking."40 The twist here is that children
are being forced to pay the consequences of their parents' actions.
Consider the case of Alan:
Back in the concrete suburbs of Los Angeles where he grew up, they
call him 'Harvard.' He is the pride of the neighborhood of children
who grew up just as he did, bouncing from one crowded apartment to
the next, sleeping on sofa cushions on the floor, wired to the constant
threat of violence. Alan was not just a street-smart kid in a baseball
cap but a gifted student who breezed through math problems and
quoted Milton and Dante. He was a voracious reader, the high school
salutatorian, and last month, he graduated from Harvard with a
degree in humanities. But now Alan hit a dead end, because one
night 19 years ago his mother led him across the Mexican border into
35. See Gonzales, supra note 34, at 2.
36. Legal proposals to address this situation have received bipartisan support since 2001 but have
nevertheless repeatedly failed in Congress. See infra notes 138-146 (discussing the DREAM Act).
37. See Gonzales, supra note 34, at 2.
38. Id.
39. See Stephen Wall, Baca Bill Offers Path to Citizenship, SAN BERNARDINO SUN, July 4, 2009,
at NI (quoting Rep. Joe Baca (D-San Bernardino)).
40. See Tim Padgett, Can Two Kids Alter Immigration Law? TIME MAGAZINE, August 2, 2007.
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California, making him an illegal immigrant.4 1
Alan is not alone. Juan Gomez has lived in this country since he was
two years old, when his parents brought him and his three-year-old
brother Alex from Colombia. They entered in 1990 with a valid six-month
visa, but when it expired the family did not return to its war-tom country
of origin.4 2 Once in the U.S., the family filed for political asylum. Their
case languished for years. After various appeals, the final decision came
down in 2003: the asylum request was denied. By then, the brothers were
14 and 15. Juan excelled at school. When his parents enrolled him at
high school, no questions were asked about his legal status thanks to the
Supreme Court's 1982 landmark decision in Plyer v. Doe, which holds
that public schools, both primary and secondary, cannot deny education to
a student due to his or her immigration legal status (or lack thereof)." As
an honors student, Juan earned close to two years of college credit
through advanced-placement courses, and achieved top marks on the SAT
test. He was living the American dream. Then the family's immigration
status caught up with him. On July 25, 2007, near the end of Juan's senior
high school year, the two brothers and their parents were picked up from
the family home, handcuffed, and taken to a deportation center.4 5
In an unlikely turn of events, Juan's high school friends and supporters
managed to make his case a cause cMl~bre in Washington D.C.: they
organized through social networks and arrived at Capitol Hill "to show
[Congress] the flaws in the system." 46 The story hit a chord; as
congressman Lincoln Diaz-Balart (R-Fla.) put it, "[t]hese brothers are just
exceptional kids, it was an awesome sight to see all those friends and
neighbors here and lobbying with intensity, concern, and love." 47 Beyond
the lobbying, there was something deeper still. It puzzled people to learn
that a child like Juan-who had arrived in this country at the age of two,
had never lived elsewhere, had managed to fully immerse in American
society, and through exceptional talent and effort had made himself a
model student-had no legal avenue open to regularize his immigration
41. Maria Sacchetti, Illegal Status Gives Harvard Grad Few Options, THE BOSTON GLOBE, July
27, 2009, at Al.
42. Id.
43. See Phuong Ly, The Outsider, WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 2009, at W10.
44. See Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (holding that undocumented children cannot be
excluded from access to state-provided public education). For commentary, see BOSNIAK, THE
CTIZEN AND THE ALIEN, supra note 33, at 64. See also OWEN FISS, A COMMUNITY OF EQUALS: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF NEW AMERICANS (1999); WILLIAM PEREZ, WE ARE AMERICANS:
UNDOCUMENTED STUDENTS PURSUING THE AMERICAN DREAM (2009).
45. They were placed in the Broward Transitional Center in Pompano Beach, Florida.
46. Padgett, Can Two Kids Alter Immigration Law?, supra note 40 (quoting Scott Elfenbien, one
of Juan's schoolmates who organized the teen lobbying effort to stop Juan's deportation).
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status and become an American citizen. And not only that, without a path
to legalization, the sword of deportation to Colombia, a dangerous
country he barely knew and certainly did not wish to return to, hung over
his head. Thanks to his schoolmates' efforts, Juan's predicament received
massive media attention. He and his brother Alex then benefited from a
rare privilege: lawmakers temporary halted their deportation. (The parents
were summarily expelled to Colombia.) This temporary status permitted
Juan a chance to enroll at Georgetown.4 8 His ascent to the top echelons of
America's higher education is as remarkable as it is fragile. Without a
permanent status or right to stay in the United States, his future looks
bleak once he graduates from college.
Since he was not born in the United States, Juan, like Alan, cannot
benefit from the generous jus soli principle embodied in the 14th
Amendment's mandate that anyone born on U.S. territory-irrespective
of the immigration status of their parents-receives the lifelong good of
American citizenship.4 9 This leaves Alan, Juan, and the tens of thousands
of other young people who were brought to the country not of their
choosing, trapped in a legal limbo. They have grown up "American" in
every possible way, speaking English and setting roots in the communities
to which they belong, but there is currently no route open to them that
provides legal recognition of the process of social immersion that has
already occurred. As the authors of a leading study on comparative
citizenship law and policy observe, U.S. immigration rules make
citizenship "impossible for this class of children."so Although the
experience of growing up in this country has "taken root in their being"
and contributed to shaping who they are and how they perceive the world,
their lack of legal status means that they have no right to remain in the
only country they know as home. At any time they face the real risk of
being detained and eventually deported. They are pawns in the rancorous
battles over immigration reform.
III: JUSNEXI: ROOTEDNESS AS A BASIS FOR MEMBERSHIP
It is against this background that this Article recommends an important
reform of current immigration law, encouraging a shift towards ajus nexi,
48. Id.
49. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and the State wherein they reside."
See also United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898) (holding that children born in the
United States to Chinese resident aliens were, by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, citizens of the
United States).
50. See T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF & DOUGLAS KLUSMEYER, CITIZENSHIP POLICIES FOR AN
AGE OF MIGRATION 14 (2002).
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or rootedness, principle of membership acquisition.1 Instead of making
citizenship turn solely on the initial, almost frozen-in-time moment of
entry, some proximity or nexus must be made between taking root and
pursuing full membership status in the polity and an actual share in its
rights and obligations. This requires us to expand the analysis beyond its
current focus on the circumstances of admission by taking into account
the establishment of genuine ties and actual stakeholding in the political
community.
Placing rootedness at center stage counters the absolutist stance that
asks us to refer back to the initial act of unauthorized entry or visa
overstay. The jus nexi call for exploring the actual, or "functional,"
conduct and agency of the person seeking legal status in the political
community is consistent with the shift away from purely formalist
conceptions of title that are familiar to us from other legal fields (from
contracts to property to family law) where social-relational interpretations
now grant protection to parties in non-traditional contexts.5 2 In the same
vein, equitable doctrines such as laches, constructive trusts, statute of
limitations waivers, and estoppels-to name but a few examples-permit
"making good" the imperfection or otherwise incomplete form of title
acquisition. The kernel of these approaches is that rights may flow from
the way a relationship functions rather than remain forever confined by its
legal form.s" The proposed jus nexi principle follows in this tradition and
crafts a viable response to today's immigration stalemate. The defense of
this route for regularization takes its practical cues, mostly by way of
analogy, from the quintessential private law examples of earned title and
equitable estoppels in the semi-sacred context of property. If there is a
route to overcome the lack of papers in that context, surely there is a way
to do so where the entitlement at issue is citizenship, a new property-like
legal status that is dispensed and regulated by the government and is not
"pre-owned" by any particular individual.
51. This section draws upon SHACHAR, supra note 26, at 27-33.
52. In the family law context, see, for example, Martha Minow & Mary Lyndon Shanley,
Revisioning the Family: Relational Rights and Responsibilities, in RECONSTRUCTING POLITICAL
THEORY: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 84-108 (Mary Lyndon Shanley & Uma Narayan eds., 1997)
(proposing the grounding of family policy and law in a nexus of relational rights and responsibilities,
as opposed to contractual and communitarian conceptions of the family). See also Jennifer Nedelsky,
Citizenship and Relational Feminism, in CANADIAN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 131-46 (Ronald Beiner
& Wayne Norman eds., 2001).
53. See, e.g., Jenni Millbank, The Role of 'Functional Family' in Same-Sex Family Recognition
Trends, 20 CHILD & FAM L.Q. 1, 1 (2008) (highlighting the prevalence of legal recognition offered to
non-traditional family structures through the adoption of a functional family model in the United
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A. Citizenship as New Property
Property is always subject to legal and philosophical contestation. As
William Blackstone observed more than two hundred years ago, "[t]here
is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination, and engages the
affections of mankind, as the right of property."54 Invoking a conceptual
analogy to social-relational property regimes therefore requires vigilance
and clarification of the intended use of these charged concepts. As every
law student surely knows, property is notorious for escaping any simple
or one-dimensional definition. It is commonly recognized that "although
property has to do with tangible and certain intangible 'things' property is
not the thing itself."s5 Rather, it is a human-made and multi-faceted
institution that creates and maintains certain relations among individuals
in reference to things." These relations have a special validity in law; a
property owner has rights that are valid against the world (rights in rem).
These are distinguished from rights in personam, which are only valid
against a specific set of individuals, such as those with whom one has
contracted. The in rem quality provides strong protection to entitlements
that are defined as "property."
The protection of entitlement, in turn, relies upon collective recognition
and enforcement. The collective dimension is important: property rights
gain meaning only when they are connected to a system of law and
governance that can enforce them.57 As such, "property must be seen as a
web of state-enforced relations of entitlement and duty between persons,
some assumed voluntarily and some not."" Given its currency in the
contemporary moral and legal landscape, the specific content and
protections given to a property entitlement are subject to contestation.
Property relations are thus never immune to reconstructive inquiry,
whether in law or in philosophy. Following Wesley Hohfeld's seminal
54. BLACKSTONE, supra note 20, at 2.
55. JOHN P. DWYER & PETER S. MENELL, PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY: A COMPARATIVE
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 1 (1998).
56. For a classic exposition of this legal realist insight, see Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some
Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913). A
detailed analysis is offered by JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF
PROPERTY (2000) [hereinafter SINGER, ENTITLEMENT].
57. See, e.g., Crawford B. Macpherson, The Meaning of Property, in PROPERTY, MAINSTREAM
AND CRITICAL POSITIONS I (Crawford B. Macpherson ed., 1978). The law component may be formal
or informal, but it must entails enforceability.
58. See Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in PROPERTY 69, 79 (J. Roland
Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980). See also DOUGLAS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS,
INSTrroTONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990). In theory, other levels of
governance (those "above" or "below" the state level) can also fulfill this enforcement function.
Furthermore, property scholars have traced how people concoct various common property regimes,
even without a formal regulatory system. See, e.g., Robert Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J.
1315 (1993); Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property
Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 453 (2002).
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work, property relations are understood to establish a range of enforceable
claims that are often described as a "bundle of rights."59 Some of the most
notable sticks in the bundle include the rights to use, to transfer, to delimit
access, and so on."o As Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed observe in
their classic article View from the Cathedral, each society or legal system
must define who has an enforceable claim in a given entitlement and must
further determine which protections, opportunities, and decision-making
processes become available to the title-holder. "
Modern theories of property apply to concrete and tangible objects (my
car, your house) but increasingly also refer to a host of more abstract or
"intangible" entitlements (shares in a company, intellectual property in
the form of patents and copyrights, professional licenses, genetic
information, even folklore practices).6 2 Changes in human relations and
social values constantly modify our understanding of what counts as
protected property. Important questions of allocation come up when we
begin to categorize certain relationships as legal property: who owns
what, and on what basis? Ownership and possession of property affects
people's livelihoods, opportunities, and freedoms.' Conflicting interests
concerning access, use, and control of goods are therefore likely to arise,
59. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917). For a more elaborate exploration of what is included in the
"bundle," see A. M. Honor, Ownership, in OxFoRD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE, A COLLABORATIVE
WORK 107 (Anthony Gordon Guest ed., 1961).
60. For a concise discussion on the form and substance of property, see Hanoch Dagan, The Craft
of Property, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1517 (2003). For a comprehensive analysis, see JEREMY WALDRON,
THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY (1988). The Blackstonian conception of property emphasizes the
right to exclude whereas the bundle of rights view rejects such prioritization.
61. Calabresi and Melamed distinguish between property, liability and inalienability rules as
offering different degrees of alienability and transfer of such entitlements. Guido Calabresi & A.
Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85
HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
62. For some of the recent illustrations of and debates surrounding "intangible" property
analyses, see, for example, United States v. Arora, 860 F. Supp. 1091 (D. Md. 1994), affd., 56 F.3d
62 (4' Cir. May 25, 1995) at 1087-98; Catherine M. Valerio Barrad, Genetic Information and
Property Theory, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 1037 (1993); Christine Haight Fairley, Protecting Folklore of
Indigenous Peoples: Is Intellectual Property the Answer? 30 CONN. L.J. 1 (1997); Jennifer Hill,
Visions and Revisions of the Shareholder, 48 Am. J. COMP. L. 39 (2000); Paul Kuruk, Protecting
Folklore under Modern Intellectual Property Regimes: A Reappraisal of the Tensions between
Individual and Communal Rights in Africa and the United States, 48 AM. U. L. REv. 769 (1999);
Naomi Mezey, The Paradoxes of Cultural Property, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 2004 (2007).
63. See, e.g., Kristen A. Carpenter, Sonia Katyal & Angela Riley, supra note 29; Mezey, supra
note 62.
64. On property's connection to freedom of autonomy, see the classic elaborations by Kant and
Hegel; for contemporary accounts, see Antoni Domenech & Daniel Raventos, Property and
Republican Freedom: An Institutional Approach to Basic Income, 2 BASIC INCOME STUDIES (2007);
Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957 (1982); Reich, The New
Property, supra note 31; Jeremy Waldron, Property, Justification, and Need, 6 CAN. J.L. &
JURISPRUDENCE 185 (1993); Ernest J. Weinrib, Poverty and Property in Kant's System ofRights, 78
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particularly with respect to items that are scarce relative to the number of
claimants or demands that human desires place upon them. Jeremy
Waldron usefully formulates property relations as offering a "system of
rules governing access to and control of [scarce] resources. "66
When applying these understandings to citizenship, perhaps the most
obvious parallel is that immigration laws create precisely such a system of
rules governing access to, and control over, scarce resources-in this
case, membership rights (and their accompanying benefits). This gate-
keeping function of citizenship is well-recognized in the literature on
political membership: "Every modern state formally defines its citizenry,
publicly identifying a set of persons as its members and residually
designating all others as non-citizens. . . . Every state attaches certain
rights and obligations to the status of citizenship." 67 Even in today's
world of increased globalization, determining who shall be granted full
membership in the polity still remains an important prerogative of the
state. Gate-keeping is, however, never absolute or unrestrained, whether
in citizenship or in property doctrine. 8 When we explore the realm of
citizenship, we soon recognize that what each citizen holds is not a private
entitlement to a tangible thing, but a relationship to other members and to
a particular (usually national) government that creates enforceable rights
and duties.
From the perspective of each member of the polity, re-conceptualizing
his or her entitlement to citizenship as a special kind of property fits well
within the definition of new property. This influential phrase was coined
by Charles Reich, referring to public law entitlements as serving the
traditional private law purposes of ensuring a baseline of security and
dignity to citizens under market-based economies." Unlike traditional
forms of wealth, which were held as private property, valuables
associated with the public title of citizenship derive specifically from
holding a legal status that is dispensed by the state alone. Such
entitlement to the status of membership in turn bestows a host of
privileges and protections (as well as certain civic obligations) upon its
65. See Jeremy Waldron, Property Law, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL
THEORY 3, 5 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996).
66. Jeremy Waldron, What is Private Property? 5 OxFORD J. LEG. STUD. 313, 318.
67. See IMMIGRATION AND THE POLITICS OF CITIZENSHIP IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA 21
(W. Rogers Brubaker ed., 1989).
68. It can be restrained by other liberties and compelling state interest. There are also internal
limits to property rights. See Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American
Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 735 (2008-2009) [hereinafter Alexander, The Social-Obligation
Norm]. See also SHACHAR, supra note 26, at 33-35 (discussing gate-keeping in citizenship).
69. See Charles Reich, The New Property, supra note 31 (referring to governmental largesse,
such as welfare entitlements, jobs, and subsidies as new property. Reich also used the example of
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holders.
Although the value of citizenship is communally generated, the
entitlement conferred upon each member is individually held."o This
intricate combination of individual and collective aspects makes
citizenship a particularly complex type of new property-like entitlement
with "priceless benefits," as the U.S. Supreme Court memorably declared,
adding that "it would be difficult to exaggerate its value and
importance."7 1 In this legal structure, the state operates as generator and
trustee of membership titles, with the critical enabling implications on the
life opportunities of its individual members that these titles confer.7 2
When citizenship is conceived in this way, the distinction between a
narrow (or "rivalrous") notion of property and a broader one that
emphasizes social relations and stewardship becomes highly relevant.73
B. Rivalrous and Social-Relational Conceptions ofProperty
The rivalrous conception of property has become synonymous in the
law and economics literature with the values of tradability and
alienability, otherwise identified with "sole and despotic" ownership.74
According to this notion of property, each owner has near-absolute
dominion over his or her assets and is free to dispose of these as he or she
sees fits. 75 This vision of property rests on a particular conception of
social life, according to which all inter-personal interactions are
characterized as "trades," and thus everything may in principle be subject
to market transaction.7' This in turn relies on what has been termed a
possessive individualism worldview, whereby social atomism and
70. 1 thank Barbara Fried for this formulation.
71. See Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943).
72. On the distinction between "private" and "common" property regimes (the latter is often
referred to by different names, with somewhat different interpretations, such as "group," "collective,"
"communal," "mixed property," or "limited-access"), see, for example, DANIEL W. BROMLEY,
ENVIRONMENT AND ECONOMY: PROPERTY RIGHTS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1991); S.V. Ciriacy-
Wantrop & Richard C. Bishop, 'Common Property' as a Concept in Natural Resources Policy, 15
NAT. RESOURCES J. 713 (1975); J. W. Harris, supra note 21; Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of
Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163 (1999).
73. The distinction between the narrow and broad conceptions draws upon C. B. Macpherson's
extensive writings on property, in particular, his essay on "Human Rights as Property Rights,"24
DISSENT 72 (1977). The analysis is also influenced by the works of authors such as Gregory
Alexander, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL
THOUGHT, 1776-1970 (1997), and SINGER, ENTITLEMENT, supra note 56.
74. BLACKSTONE, supra note 20, at 2. For a familiar exposition of the narrow view, see RICHARD
A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (7th ed. 2007). For a sharp critique of this "commodified"
understanding of property, see MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES (1996).
75. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 20.
76. For a critical assessment of this vision of social life, see Frank I. Michelman, Property as a
Constitutional Right, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1097 (1981); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-
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unrestricted commodification rule, and where self-interest is the core
motivation for human action. 1
In contrast, there is a competing and older vision of property that is
regaining renewed attention, which I wish to bring to the fore in the
context of citizenship, labeling it the broad (or "social relational")
conception. Here, property is seen as part of a web of social and political
relations, wherein people depend upon others "not only to thrive but even
just to survive."7 This view dates back to Aristotle and treats property not
as an end in itself but as a means toward advancing human flourishing and
building relations of trust.79 As a collectively generated good that creates
a complex set of entitlements and obligations among various social actors,
citizenship offers a textbook example of re-emerging interpretations of
property as constituting a web of relations that are imbued with
obligations towards promoting the public good rather than merely
satisfying individual preferences and entrenching existing power
relations.o This broader perspective permits us to see citizenship regimes
not only as generating intricate rules that define the allocation of
membership, but also as bearing considerable effects on the distribution of
voice and opportunity among those residing on the same territory who
nevertheless do not share equal access to the government-distributed
status of membership. These inequalities are particularly disturbing given
that access to the said social good is determined almost exclusively by
circumstances beyond our control: where and to whom we are born, or
under what circumstances our parents crossed the border many years ago.
To acknowledge property (and citizenship) as a human construct that is
not impervious to change is to open up the existing system of distribution
to critical assessment and innovation.
The answer to today's immigration problems lies not in "de-valuing"
citizenship nor watering down its content nor declaring its imminent
77. The term "possessive individualism" was coined by C.B. Macpherson in THE POLITICAL
THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM: HOBBES TO LOCKE (1962). The same behavior is often
described by modem neoclassic economists (as well as law-and-economics scholars) as a vehicle for
preference satisfaction, based on the assumption that there exists a "human propensity to be a self-
interested, rational utility maximizer." See Carol M. Rose, Property as Storytelling: Perspectives from
Game Theory, Narrative Theory, Feminist Theory, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 37, 29 (1990).
78. See Alexander, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY, supra note 73, at 2.
79. See Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm, supra note 68; Hanoch Dagan, Exclusion and
Inclusion in Property, Tel Aviv University Law Faculty Papers, Working Paper 109 (2009), available
at http://law.bepress.com/taulwps/fp/artl 09.
80. For a concise overview, see Stephen R. Munzer, Property as Social Relations, in NEW
ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 36 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001);
SINGER, ENTITLEMENT, supra note 56. This emphasis on 'property as relations' is also consistent with
various strands of feminist theory, which frequently foregrounds relationships and relatedness. For an
illuminating discussion, see DONNA DICKENSON, PROPERTY IN THE BODY: FEMINIST PERSPECTlVES
(2007). For the development of the concept of stewardship in relation to indigenous cultural property,
see Carpenter, Katyal & Riley, IN DEFENSE OF PROPERTY, supra note 29.
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"death" or "withering away," as some have suggested.8 ' Instead, what is
required, and urgently so, is a diversification of the methods of
membership title allocation-specifically, the adoption of a framework
for inclusion that reflects a social relational conception of citizenship and
thus complements the traditional jus soli and jus sanguinis mechanisms
for defining the legal boundaries of membership. That foundation is
defined here by rootedness, or the jus nexi principle of membership
assignment.
C. Rootedness Defended
The jus nexi principle is informed by progressive reconceptions of
property and related fields of law, spanning from contracts to family law
to conflict of laws.82 These influential accounts have rejected the
traditional emphasis on static, blanket formalism, highlighting instead the
value of an actual, real, everyday and meaningful web of relations of
human interaction." Instead of focusing on the formal creation or
legalese (of contract, marriage, and so on), this type of analysis looks to
acts and conduct in light of the circumstances in which parties operate in
order to determine whether or not an implicit promise, property transfer,
or permanent relationship has been established by deed.84 This approach
is widely employed in a host of contemporary legal arenas. Consider, for
example, the status given to non-marital cohabitation relationships.
Instead of applying a formalist legal interpretation under which such
relationships were categorically unrecognized and unprotected, today
many jurisdictions treat them as generating a range of actual rights and
obligations between partners as well as towards third parties, even without
the couple entering into a formal agreement or undertaking registration.
81. DAVID JACOBSON, RIGHTS ACROSS BORDERS: IMMIGRATION AND THE DECLINE OF
CITIZENSHIP (1996) (arguing that postnationalism is breaking the bond between individual and state);
PETER J. SPIRO, BEYOND CITIZENSHIP: AMERICAN IDENTITY AFTER GLOBALIZATION (2008); Peter H.
Schuck, Membership in the Liberal Polity: The Devaluation of American Citizenship, 3 GEO. IMMIG.
L.J. 1 (1989) (arguing against devaluing);.Peter J. Spiro, Whither Citizenship? 24 FOCUS L. STUD. I
(2009).
82. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Blackman, State Succession and Statelessness: The Emerging Right to an
Effective Nationality under International Law, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1141 (1998) and text
accompanying notes infra 84-88.
83. For an illuminating discussion, see generally Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in
American Property Law, supra note 68; Stephen R. Munzer, Property as Social Relations, supra note
80.
84. See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611
(1988); Karen Knop, Relational Nationality: On Gender and Nationality in International Law, in
CITIZENSHIP TODAY: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES AND PRACTICES 89 (T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Douglas
Klusmeyer eds., 2001); Robert Leckey, Relational Contract and Other Models of Marriage, 40
OSGOODE HALL L.J. (2002); Stephen R. Munzer, Property as Social Relations, supra note 80.
85. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §457:39 (2009) ("Persons cohabiting and acknowledging
each other as husband and wife, and generally reputed to be such, for the period of 3 years, and until
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On this reading, factors such as the pooling of resources or the sharing of
a household for an extended period of time become evidence of the
seriousness of the relationship and, in turn, its legal validity. Another
example is found in determinations concerning the best interests of the
child for custody or visitation purposes, which today are governed by
factual, attentive, case-by-case decision-making procedures, rather than a
reliance on fixed and gendered presumptions (as was the case in the
past).8 ' The growing use of the constructive trust to achieve equitable
distribution of shared property among partners based on imputed duties of
good faith and fair dealing in the absence of a formal agreement offers yet
another illustration of this larger trend." Consider also the relevance of
one's place of abode for determining tax liability for foreign residents, or
in defining eligibility for local voting rights, admission to public schools,
access to municipal services, and so on. "
There is also a surprisingly rich body of comparative and international
jurisprudence that provides support to the idea of reinvigorating
definitions of membership by adopting a social-relational, genuine-
connection criterion for defining citizenship. Consider the influential
landmark 1955 Nottebohm decision of the International Court of Justice in
which the ICJ held that citizenship is not "merely an empty title;"
citizenship must reflect instead:
a legal bond having as its basis the social fact of attachment, a
genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments, together
with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties. It may be said to
constitute the juridical expression of the fact that the individual upon
whom it is conferred . . . is in fact more closely connected with the
population of the [s]tate conferring [citizenship] than with any other
314 Mont. 20, 62 P.3d 1114; DeMelo v. Zompa, 844 A.2d 174, 177 (R.I. 2004).
86. See Linda D. Elrod & Milfred D. Dale, Paradigm Shifts and Pendulum Swings in Child
Custody: The Interests of Children in the Balance, 42 FAM. L.Q. 381 (2008); Barbara Bennett
Woodhouse, Child Custody in the Age of Children's Rights: The Search for a Just and Workable
Standard, 33 FAM. L.Q. 815, 818 (2000).
87. See Laura Weinrib, Reconstructing Family: Constructive Trust at Relational Dissolution, 37
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 207 (2002). For married couples, equitable division of property has become
the norm that is applied even in states that have only presumptions of equal division of property or
have failed to adopt the equality standard. See Carolyn J. Franz & Hanoch Dagan, Properties of
Marriage, COLUM. L. REV. 75, 101-102 (2004). The American Law Institute (ALI) Principles of the
Law of Family Dissolution has recommended the extension of rules of property division to domestic
partners as well. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 4.03 (2002). 1 thank Jana
Singer and Laura Kessler for guiding me through the maze of these recommended rules.
88. See Middle Twp. Bd. of Ed. v. K.K. and P.K., 93 N.J.A.R. 2d (EDU) 461 (1992). (holding
that year-long residency in a local campground in violation of zoning laws had no impact on the
determination of domicile under New Jersey's school residency law). See also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
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[s]tate.89
In this particular case, the ICJ had to determine whether a citizen of
Germany who had resided in Guatemala for most of his adult life before
acquiring a Liechtensteinian passport was entitled to enjoy protection by
one of these countries (Liechtenstein) against another (Guatemala). This
was not an easy case. It required the international court to "pierce the
veil" of membership title in the search for that something else that makes
citizenship effective at the international law level vis-A-vis another polity.
To address this challenge, the ICJ crystallized the principle of real and
effective citizenship: namely, instead of just looking at the formal status of
membership, the court explored and then gave preference to the actual
connection "which accorded with the facts."90 In the Nottebohm case, the
real and effective ties pointed to Germany (and possibly the place of fixed
abode, namely Guatemala), but certainly not to Liechtenstein, in which
Nottebohm had a tenuous connection at best. The more general lesson to
be drawn from Nottebohm is that instead of relying on mere formal status
of affiliation to determine citizenship, one must examine the social fact of
attachment-the genuine connection of the person to the polity-as a
valid and relevant basis for membership allocation. Similar developments
are occurring on the ground at the local and municipal levels. Major
European cities (Amsterdam is a key example) grant local franchise to
non-citizens who reside in the metropolis for at least five years,
asserting-based on factors such as employment, residence, and social
attachment-their genuine connection to the local community. Those
benefiting from these provisions are then entitled to have their interests
and voices represented in citywide elections and to form political
parties.91
The ICJ articulates several different factors that need to be taken into
consideration in identifying whether a "real and effective link" has been
89. See Nottebohm (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4, 23 (Apr. 6) [hereinafter Nottebohm].
90. Summary of Nottebohm Case (Second Phase) Judgment of 6 April 1955, ICJ-CIJ.ORG,
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/1 8/2676.pdf(last visited Nov. 4 2010).
91. In the United States, non-citizens are already voting in several local elections, for instance, in
certain communities in Maryland. In Chicago, non-citizen can vote in school board elections. Other
metropolitan areas, including New York City, have considered the adoption of non-citizen voting
rights as well. These current practices revive a forgotten tradition in American history, which
permitted non-citizens to vote in various local, state, and federal elections. See generally RON
HAYDUK, DEMOCRACY FOR ALL: RESTORING IMMIGRANT VOTING RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES
(2006) (recounting this fascinating history). In Canada there is an ongoing campaign to extend the
right to vote in municipal elections to non-citizens in Toronto, as well as in Vancouver. In Europe, all
European Union citizens have a treaty right to vote and run for office in municipal elections
(according to local guidelines) irrespective of nationality. Many European countries have further
extended a similar right to vote to non-citizens outside the European Union. See DAVID C. EARNEST,
OLD NATIONS, NEW VOTERS: NATIONALISM, TRANSNATIONALISM, AND DEMOCRACY IN THE ERA OF
GLOBAL MIGRATION (2008) (analyzing why democracies give non-citizens the right to vote and
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established between an individual and a nation, granting that the weight of
these factors might vary from one case to the next. This list of factors,
which is illustrative rather than conclusive, includes: "the habitual
residence of the individual concerned but also the centre of his [or her]
interests, his [or her] family ties, his [or her] participation in public life,
attachment shown by him [or her] for a given country and inculcated in
his [or her] children, etc."9 2 This center-of-interests test is pragmatic and
social relational; it requires evidence of the establishment of observable,
real and effective links between the individual and the political
community. Such a connection need not rely on birthright; instead, it
traces the attachment between the individual and the political community
on the basis of factual membership and affected interests.
In the same vein, we find a string of influential U.S. court decisions
emphasizing the significance of developing ties and identification with the
country over time as a potential basis for bestowing citizenship and its
benefits upon long-term residents." This notion of earning entitlement
reflects the center-of-interests idea: the longer the person resides in the
polity, the deeper his or her ties to its society, the stronger the claim for
inclusion and membership. 94 As one commentator observes, "no matter
how strongly our formal laws deny it, our conduct [of having persons live,
work and participate in a community over many years] creates the
obligation." 95 This incremental process, in which one's center of life-
gravity shifts, is central to the jus nexi principle. By focusing on a
"genuine connection of existence, interests, and sentiments" rather than
merely formal titles, jus nexi provides substance to the idea that real and
effective ties fostered on the ground deserve some form of legal
recognition-here, by granting a path to earned citizenship based on the
social connectedness that has already been established. Such an approach
enables us to welcome into the political community those who have
already become social members based on their actual participation in the
everyday life and economy of the jurisdiction, and through their
interdependence with its legal and governance structures. As Hiroshi
Motomura eloquently observes, this emphasis on the ties that bind allows
law to "take time into account by acknowledging and giving legal
92. ICJ Summary of Nottebohm, supra note 90.
93. See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976) ("[A]s the alien's tie grows stronger, so
does the strength of his claim to an equal share in that munificence [the bounty that a conscientious
sovereign makes available to its citizens].").
94. This model is referred to as "citizenship as affiliation" by Hiromi Motomura. AMERICANS IN
WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES (2006). See
also Joseph H. Carens, On Belonging: What We Owe People Who Stay, 30 BOSTON REV. (2005).
95. Gerald Lopez, Undocumented Mexican Migration: In Search of a Just Immigration Law and
Policy, 28 UCLA L. REV. 615, 696 (1981).
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meaning to what has already occurred."96 Instead of focusing on the
initial moment of entry or asking whether a person happened to have been
born in a given country, the more significant set of questions under the jus
nexi framework would include the following: where he or she actually
lives, where his or her center of interests lie, and where, as a result, to
place "the legal bond [of citizenship] having as its basis the social fact of
attachment." 97
D. Democratic Accountability
The importance of real, genuine links to a community as a basis for
membership entitlement and political participation is also increasingly
recognized by political philosophers and democratic theorists. As Tomas
Hammar observes, "[iun affluent societies being a member of [the
country's citizenry] is in itself a valuable social asset which is, however,
taken for granted by those who already possess it." 98 The incredibly
important property-like entitlement that we call citizenship "is distributed
by [those already counting as citizens] to others, who have not got
membership but who would like to get it." 99 Given this framework, the
challenge is to determine the correct regulative principle for such
distribution, which, as John Rawls once put it, "depends on the nature of
that thing [distributed]."' 00 In the context of our discussion, any new
principle for bestowing citizenship needs to correspond better with the
fact and intent of membership as well as the actual content associated
with this legal status.
The rootedness principle best addresses situations in which a permanent
inconsistency occurs between lack of legal status and the fact of social
attachment and an intention to stay. As an equitable framework, jus nexi
gives legal validity to the significance of the involvement and stake of
long-term residents in the life of the polity, acknowledging these real and
effective ties in defining access to the collective good of citizenship for
the individuals involved. In a world of growing mobility across borders,
we can no longer rely merely on transmission by birthright or ongoing
exclusion based on the remote moment of entry, important and
meaningful as it might be for determining the initial (lack of) membership
96. Hiroshi Motomura, We Asked for Workers, but Families Came: Time, Law, and the Family in
Immigration and Citizenship, 14 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 103, 250 (2006) [hereinafter Motomura, We
Asked for Workers]. See also Linda Bosniak, Being Here: Ethical Territoriality and the Rights of
Immigrants, 8 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 389 (2007) [hereinafter Bosniak, Being Here].
97. Nottebohm, supra note 89, at 23.
98. TOMAS HAMMAR, DEMOCRACY AND THE NATION STATE: ALIENS, DENIZENs AND CITIZENS
IN A WORLD OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION 20 (1990).
99. Id. at 20.
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status."o' Instead, any reflective principle of citizenship allotment that
fulfills the ideals of democratic inclusion and accountability must take
into account the interdependence that has developed over time between an
individual and society.10 2 This requires us to ask whether "an individual's
long-term circumstances of life link her own well-being to a particular
polity."0 3 If the answer is affirmative, serious consideration must be
given to granting her the security and dignity that comes with sharing in
the collective rights and responsibilities of citizenship.
Returning to contemporary American jurisprudence, it is remarkable
that we already have in operation the legal idea of "earning" membership
through building actual, genuine ties to the political community. Under
Section 240A of the Immigration and Nationality Act, for example, even
persons subject to a formal removal order are permitted to ask the
government for a waiver that would allow them to stay in the country.'"
In assessing such requests, immigration judges are instructed to consider
factors such as the length of residence, family ties, evidence of value and
service to the community, employment history, and the extreme hardship
that might be incurred by the respondent and her family if deportation
were to take place. 0I Related factors to be considered include the
person's age, health, ability to travel, good moral character, and other
"equities" that can weigh in favor of allowing long-term residents or close
family members to remain in the country and adjust their status,
101. As a supplementary route to citizenship, jus nexi is designed to complement the traditional
principles of jus soli and jus sanguinis rather than replace them. Those who have access to American
citizenship by virtue of birth or standard naturalization proceedings will not need to resort to the jus
nexi principle. A related structure of relief, which operates on a case-by-case basis, is found in
Canadian immigration law which allows for "humanitarian and compassionate" grounds for
cancellation of removal in those cases where the return to the home country would lead to excessive
hardship. See Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), S.C. 2001. c. 27, §§ 25-26 (Can.);
Ken Yhap v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration) (1990) 9 IMM. L.R. (2d) 243 (Fed
T.D.) (holding that applicants are entitled to a full and fair review in the determination of
humanitarian and compassionate grounds). In the United Kingdom, undocumented immigrants who
have resided in the country for an extended period of time are allowed to seek an indefinite leave to
remain by applying to the Home Office. In considering such discretionary grants, the Home Office
takes account of compassionate circumstances, continuous residence, and the strength of connection
to the United Kingdom. In these various jurisdictions, a criminal record almost always bars a
discretionary grant to remain.
102. See Rainer Baubock, Stakeholder Citizenship and Democratic Participation in Migration
Contexts in THE TIES THAT BIND: ACCOMMODATING COMPLEX DIVERSITY IN CANADA AND THE
EUROPEAN UNION (Johanne Poirier & Paul Magnette, eds., 2009).
103. Baubock, supra note 102.
104. See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 240A(a) (2009) ("The Attorney General
may cancel removal in the case of an alien who is inadmissible or deportable from the United States if
the alien-(1) has been an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence for not less than 5 years, (2)
has resided in the United States continuously for 7 years after having been admitted in any status, and
(3) has not been convicted of any aggravated felony.") Those subject to a removal order based on an
aggravated felony are not eligible for the waiver. A more lenient standard was in effect until 1996.
105. See In re C-V-T-, 22 I&N Dec. 7 (BIA 1998); In re Marin, 16 I&N Dec. 581 (BIA 1978).
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overcoming the specific grounds for their removal, which in certain cases
may include unlawful presence in the country. 06 In situations where
removal amounts to extreme hardship, the various "facts and
circumstances of each case," as a leading opinion instructs, must be taken
into account.o0 The ties that bind-factors sufficient to establish
retrospective legal recognition-may include instances of civic
engagement, such as being an active parent in a child's school,
volunteering for community service, or caring for a needy relative. 0 8
This kind of determination requires probing beyond the formal status of
a person's admission into a country, looking to the actual conduct of the
person in the context of her social attachments and community ties. This
shift in perspective flows not just from crystallized positive legal rules
and procedures, but also from the more foundational values associated
with being a constitutional democracy-a regime that is committed to
equality among its members and that ideally draws its legitimacy from
including all those habitually affected by its laws and institutions in the
decision-making body of members.109
Categorically denying long-term residents even a chance at establishing
eligibility for membership fails to serve this democratic ideal. It further
risks transforming settled migrants into pariahs, thus eroding the very
preservation of the society at large as a community of equals.o"0 This
should deeply concern not only those in the nation-of-immigrants camp,
but also those who hold dear the principles of a nation of laws. We are all
too familiar with the painful history of exclusion from citizenship,
especially on the basis of race and gender that persisted in different forms
for almost two centuries following the birth of the Republic."' The
United States, as American citizenship scholar Rogers Smith elucidates,
106. These factors were listed in proposed rules issued in 1979 by the INS that sought to identify
the relevant consideration for the discretion in removal matters. See 44 Fed. Reg. 36191 (1979). These
guidelines were later withdrawn, because it "is impossible to list or foresee all of the adverse or
favorable factors which may be present in any given set of circumstances." 46 Federal Registrar 9119
(1981). For further discussion, see Maurice Roberts, The Exercise ofAdministrative Discretion Under
the Immigration Laws 13 S.D. L. REV. 144 (1975).
107. In re Cervantes 22 l&N Dec. 560 (BIA 1999).
108. See, e.g., In re Maria Teresa Garcia De Nunez (2007 Administrative Appeal Office).
109. See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 122 (1989). See also Christopher
L. Eisgruber, Birthright Citizenship and the Constitution 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 54 (1997) (articulating
the importance of the democratic argument in justifying the United States jus soli principle).
110. FIsS,supra note 44.
111. For critical historical accounts of American citizenship's racial and gendered exclusions,
see, for example, CANDICE LEWIS BREDBENNER, A NATIONALITY OF HER OWN: WOMEN, MARRIAGE,
AND THE LAW OF CITIZENSHIP (1998); IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL
CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1996); ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF
CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY (1997); Nancy F. Cott, Marriage and Women's Citizenship in the
United States, 1830-1934, 103 AM. HIST. REV. 1440 (1998); Leti Volpp, Divesting Citizenship: On
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now has a "potent 'obligation to include' that flows from a combination
of . .. ethical commitments and [the country's] past and present roles in
constituting the identities of many persons whom [it presently does] not
recognize as full citizens or as members at all."ll 2 As the interdependence
between the individual and the political community deepens, the claim for
moving away from today's hyper-legalistic paradigm toward a jus nexi
approach becomes stronger. The government's prerogative to remove and
deport arguably becomes restricted, too."I In the old jargon of private law
reasoning, "in the eyes of equity," providing a route to membership
(rather than advancing the formalistic resort to deportation) under these
circumstances offers a more apt resolution, otherwise the more powerful
party, the government, "fail[s] to do what is just."I14
As historian Mae Ngai observes, older immigration policies that were
once prevalent in American history (prior to the restrictive turn that began
in the 1920s), included statutes of limitations that restricted the
government's prerogative to deport those who have already settled in the
country as well as various discretionary mechanisms for individuals to
adjust their status in cases of long-term residence, marriage to a citizen, or
where deportation would result in hardship. These mechanisms served in
the past as important correctives to the otherwise harsh effect of the black
letter of the law and were seen at the time "as consistent with the general
philosophy of the melting pot."' Today's democratic argument in favor
of reviving such restrictions on the power to exclude relies less on the
112. See Rogers M. Smith, The Principle of Constituted Identities and the Obligation to Include
1 ETHICS & GLOBAL POL. 139, 140 (2008) [hereinafter Smith, The Obligation to Include].
113. The government's power to remove is never absolute; for instance, past and proposed
legalization provisions in the United States, and in other comparable countries, typically require a
showing of good moral character. The same pattern is manifested in individualized and discretionary
forms of relief. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(B), Immigration and Nationality Act §
240A(b)(1)(B). On the policy considerations, see generally Demetrious G. Papademetriou, The
'Regularization' Option in Managing Illegal Migration More Effectively: A Comparative Perspective
(Migration Policy Institute Policy Brief, Sept. 2005).
114. For a comprehensive discussion of these equity doctrines, see STEPHEN WADDAMS,
DIMENSIONS OF PRIVATE LAW: CATEGORIES AND CONCEPTS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL
REASONING 57-79 (2003).
115. See MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN
AMERICA 59, 60-90 (2004). Even today unauthorized migrants may qualify for discretionary relief in
the form of "cancellation of removal" discussed above, although it is more difficult to obtain today
than in the past due to legislative restriction of this form of relief. See supra notes 104-108 and
accompanying text. These individualized and discretionary mechanisms for regularization differ from
"exceptional" and all encompassing legalization programs; the latter are politically far more charged
than the former. See Patrick Weil, All or Nothing? What the United States can Learn from Europe as
it Contemplates Circular Migration and Legalization for Undocumented Migrants 10-11 (The
German Marshall Fund of the United States, Immigration Paper Series, May 2010) [hereinafter Weil,
All or Nothing]. See also Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Outside the Law, 108 COL. L. REv. 2037,
2047-2055 (2008) (describing different avenues for unauthorized migrants to qualify for lawful status
such as individual grants based on family relationship with U.S. citizens or permanent residents or the




Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol23/iss1/2
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 23:110
melting pot ideal and more on the view of individuals as agents who
ought to be given an opportunity to participate in shaping the laws and
political institutions that affect them most."' The point is to ensure that
the government is fulfilling its obligation to include (in Smith's
terminology) by providing a voice in the political process to those whose
identity and life prospects largely have been constituted by its laws and
institutions. This can be achieved by giving them a path to earned
membership on which they can embark if they so wish." 7
Importantly, fulfilling these equitable obligations does not conflict with
establishing or sustaining distinct political communities that define,
uphold, and enforce membership boundaries and procedures for
regulating immigration."' What it does demand, however, is that long-
term residents who are already present in the country and have become
part and parcel of its social fabric and economy are not permanently
excluded from co-authorship of the laws to which they are subject. This is
a variant of the oldest participatory and constructive themes of American
citizenship, defining and redefining "We the People."'19 In a democracy,
116. See, e.g., BENHABIB, THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS, supra note 25, at 220 ("democracy ... [is] a
form of government based upon public autonomy, namely that those subject to the laws are also their
authors."); DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 109; Joshua Cohen, Deliberative
Democracy and Democratic Legitimacy, in THE GOOD POLITY: NORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE STATE
17-34 (Alan Hamlin & Philip Petit eds., 1989); Eisgruber, Birthright Citizenship and the Constitution,
supra note 109.
117. The formulation avoids the imposition of status that occurs under ex lege regularization
programs. See infra notes 132-134 and accompanying text. It also permits policymakers greater
control over the process, by shaping the criteria and administrative methodologies to be used when
according status, especially where regularization is treated as an "'exceptional' and 'one-time only"'
measure. See Papademetriou, supra note 115, at 6; Weil, All or Nothing, supra note 117, at 10-11.
From the democratic accountability perspective, regularization of status permits the admitting society
to maintain itself as a community of equals, increases political voice, and reduces social and
economic marginalization. Although non-citizens are entitled to certain rights and protections
irrespective of status, see LINDA BOSNIAK, THE ALIEN AND THE CITIZENS, supra note 33, there is a
serious implementation gap. To address this concern from a lawyering perspective, immigrants' rights
advocates often argue "that the non-citizen is entitled not just to rights, but the free exercise of rights,
because of the behavioral similarity they bear to status citizens; by this argument, the immigrant is
sufficiently citizen-like so as to justify closing the rights gap between them." See Muneer I. Ahmad,
Developing Citizenship, 10 ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP (forthcoming 2011).
118. For an influential articulation of this position, see WALZER, supra note 33, at 31-63. Even
scholars who hold a more cosmopolitan position than Walzer emphasize the tension between
"democratic attachments" that may cross borders and membership boundaries that are defined
primarily by sovereign territorial units (operating alone, or in concert, as in the European Union). See,
e.g., Seyla Benhabib, Borders, Boundaries, and Citizenship, 38 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 673 (2005).
119. As Smith acknowledges, however: "The US Constitution was written behind closed doors
by less than five dozen white Christian men who lacked explicit authorization to do so. It nonetheless
begins, 'We the People of the United States ... do ordain and establish this Constitution.' This history
makes it reasonable to question how far the American Constitution was genuinely constituted by the
American "people"-but it undeniably played a prominent role in constituting such a 'people."' See
Smith, The Obligation to Include, supra note 112, at 139. For a powerful account of how the Framers
could claim to speak as "We the People" despite not being representative of them, see AKHIL REED
AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 4-53 (2005); on proclaiming higher law in the
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the beauty of the definition of the people or the citizenry body is that it is
never closed or fully settled, especially not in diverse societies such as the
United States. This acknowledgment in part fuels the intensity and at
times ferocity of the nation-of-laws versus nation-of-immigrants debate.
The broad conception that informs the rootedness framework emphasizes
the underlying human values that property and citizenship serve and the
social relations that they shape and reflect. This makes ever more pressing
the need to close the gap between the social reality of membership and the
legal bar against admission, especially if we wish to avoid creating the
reality of a permanent pariah class of non-citizens. 120 In this way, jus nexi
reflects the idea of democratic accountability within a bounded political
community, according to which those who are continuously and
habitually subject to the coercive powers of the state must eventually be
given the opportunity to gain a hand in shaping its laws.
E. The Ties that Bind
To define membership in a manner consistent with the concept of
rootedness, we can no longer focus only on the moment of entry as
determinative of legal status. Instead, jus nexi demands that we focus on
the "actual relationships the individual has developed with a society: a
family, friends, a job, association membership, professional
acquaintances, opportunities."l21 This illustrative list of factors was
defined many years ago by Alexander Aleinikoff, one of America's most
prominent immigration and citizenship law scholars. It can be further
extended and updated to include additional connecting factors such as
volunteering on school boards, providing community services,
contributing to the work of religious organizations, and so on. This more
varied set of links is designed to ensure a more diverse pool of potential
recipients; if, for example, only paid participation in the labor force or
business ownership are counted towards proof of establishing the social
fact of membership, then we run the risk of disadvantaging stay-at-home
parents (particularly women) and others whose life circumstances may
prevent them from fully engaging in the formal, paid marketplace. With
this more expansive definition of actual communal ties, even the severity
of an initial unlawful entry may be partly diminished over time if one's
status is later adjusted; the deeper the interdependence, the stronger the
claim for embarking on the social-relational rootedness-based path to
BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: VOL. 2 TRANSFORMATIONS (1998).
120. FISS, supra note 44.
121. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Aliens, Due Process and 'Community Ties': A Response to Martin,
44 U. PITT. L. REv. 237, 244 (1983).
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earned membership.122 These examples illustrate that the logic of
rootedness is already reflected (without being so named) in our legal
conceptualization of membership. This is significant in defending the
application of the principle of genuine connection, orjus nexi.
An emphasis on rootedness is important for another reason: it offers a
coherent explanation for certain aspects of legal doctrine and positive law
that otherwise appear sporadic and without proper conceptual basis.
Consider the fact that a period of actual and continuous residence in the
United States has been part of the process of acquiring post-birth
citizenship in America ever since the enactment of the original
Naturalization Act of 1790, one of the most significant and earliest
statutes adopted by Congress. The 1790 Naturalization Act held that a
newcomer of good moral character who was willing to take an oath to
support the Constitution had to first establish that he had "resided within
the limits and under the jurisdiction of the United States for the term of
two years" before gaining eligibility for citizenship."l 2 3 The residency
requirement was later increased from two to five years,12 4 and despite the
many ups-and-downs in the history of immigration to America, this five-
year requirement has proven remarkably stable and persistent. 2 5 It
remains prescribed by U.S. naturalization law to this date. 126
With the jus nexi perspective firmly in view, we can see additional
indicators of the significance of actual ties in establishing eligibility to
citizenship in other provisions of immigration law. For instance, the
United States has already adopted what we might refer to as a rootedness
requirement with respect to the transfer of membership entitlement to a
child born abroad to American parents. If born outside the United States,
the child will gain citizenship at birth only if one of the parents resided in
the United States at some time prior to the birth. In other words, the
parent must have fulfilled the genuine-connection requirement before he
or she can transmit membership in the political community to the next
122. As a supplementary route to citizenship, jus nexi is designed to complement the traditional
principles ofjus soli and jus sanguinis rather than replace them. It will not affect the legal status of
those who have access to American citizenship by virtue of birth or standard naturalization rules. See
supra notes 22-26, and the accompanying text.
123. See Naturalization Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 103 (1790). The 1790 Act also reflected the deeply
exclusionary racial and gender barriers of the time: its benefits were restricted to "free white persons."
For critical accounts, see supra note Ill and accompanying text.
124. See Naturalization Act of 1795, 1 Stat. 414 (1795). This change also required filing of a
three years' notice of intent to apply for citizenship.
125. The main exception to this remarkable continuity is found in the more restrictive 1798 Act,
which increased the residency requirement to fourteen years in the United States and five years in a
State. This more demanding standard was repealed in 1802, when the 1795 standard of five years of
residence was restored.
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generation. 127 If one of the parents of a born-abroad child is a non-citizen,
then U.S. law further specifies that the citizen parent must have been
physically present in the United States for at least five years preceding the
birth of the child, two of which must have been after the age of
fourteen.128 This formalizes into law the requirement that a person
through whom the precious entitlement of citizenship is transmitted must
have experienced the lived reality of being a citizen. (The emphasis on the
experience of actual membership permits avoiding charged identity and
belonging questions about what content is given, or ought to be given, to
the designation of being an American.) This legal requirement is typically
fulfilled by making the United States the actual place of residence for a
specified number of years.
This is a more balanced approach than the one recently adopted by the
Canadian government through amendments to the Citizenship Act, which
now denies the option for a Canadian born abroad to pass citizenship on
to his or her children if the latter were born abroad too. 12 9 A jus nexi
requirement would, on the other hand, permit the revival of the previous
Canadian legal position that held that a second-generation child born
abroad can acquire and uphold citizenship if meaningful ties are
maintained between the parent or child and her (ancestral) home country,
as evidenced by factors such as registering as a citizen or residing in
Canada for a period of at least one year immediately preceding the date of
application. Other ways to demonstrate meaningful ties under the
previous law included the demonstration of adequate knowledge of one of
Canada's official languages or employment in the Canadian public
service, whether in the country or abroad.'3 0 These various activities were
legally interpreted as evidence of a sufficiently strong connection between
the individual born abroad and the membership-granting political
community, a substantial enactment of jus nexi principles unfortunately
abandoned by the recent changes to the law.
127. 8 U.S.C. § 301(c) (2009); Weedin v. Chin Bow, 274 U.S. 657 (1927).
128. Section 301(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act provides that "[a] person born
outside the geographical limits of the United States and its outlying possessions of parents one of
whom is an alien, and the other a citizen of the United States who, prior to the birth of such person,
was physically present in the United States or its outlying possessions for a period or periods totaling
not less than five years, at least two of which were after attaining the age of fourteen years" will gain
citizenship at birth.
129. Citizenship Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-29, s. 3(3)(a) (amended 2009) (Can.). However, the
legislation provides an exception for children who would be rendered stateless if not granted
Canadian citizenship. Id. at s. 5(5).
130. Citizenship Regulations, SOR/1993-246 s. 16(a)-(b) (Can) (prior to the Citizenship Act's
amendments on Apr. 17, 2009).
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F. Earned Citizenship
Although prolonged residence typically plays an important role in
defining real and effective links, jus nexi takes seriously the idea that
inclusive, democratic citizenship should reflect a nexus between rights
and duties as well as between membership and social attachment, rather
than one that immediately ties long-term settlement with an interest in
becoming a citizen. This last point distinguishes the principle of jus nexi
from ex lege, or automatic naturalization for anyone whose presence in a
polity is deemed permanent.' 3 1 Like the ex lege idea, the jus nexi principle
is normatively designed to shrink the gap between partaking in actual
membership and gaining political voice; it views every long-term resident
as a citizen in the making. By contrast, jus nexi does not force
membership upon anyone; it requires long-term residents to display both
intent and effort to join the collective if they choose to embark on the path
of earned citizenship. The rootedness principle creates a presumption of
inclusion on behalf of those whose life-center has already shifted, but it
requires individuals to act in order for this eligibility to affect their
citizenship status. What is required here is not mere physical presence on
the territory, but also the expression of will to become a full member. In
this way, jus nexi differs from a conception of membership that makes
territorial presence the all-or-nothing criterion. 132 It thus escapes the
autonomy-diminishing aspect of an automatic, ex lege incorporation of
individuals into the polity based on the sheer passage of time.m3
In this respect, jus nexi allows both democratic accountability and
political equality for those whose well-being is directly affected by the
legal authority of the polity-namely, those who reside within its
jurisdiction and are regularly subject to the full extent of its coercive
powers. Related processes of gradual incorporation through participation
in the life of the polity are familiar to us from the naturalization
procedure, which typically requires a newcomer to fulfill a five-year
mandatory residence requirement before she can apply for citizenship.
131. See RUTH RUBIO-MARIN, supra note 114 (arguing in favor or automatic incorporation into
the polity after the passage of a fixed number of years). See also DORA KOSTAKOPOULOU, THE
FuTURE GOVERNANCE OF CITIZENSHIP (2008) (offering a foundation for citizenship that relies on
legal concepts of domicile).
132. The rootedness approach, unlike the extreme versions of the nation-of-immigrants
argument, does not assume that merely "landing" in the territory is sufficient for gaining access to
membership. Presence in the territory importantly triggers extensive rights and recognition, but it does
not automatically entail access to citizenship, which is more demanding than mere presence and
residence, embodying a deeper bond and an experience of becoming a member. For an illuminating
discussion of the importance of a person's "hereness," see Linda Bosniak, Being Here, supra note 96.
133. On this latter point, see Baub6ck, Stakeholder Citizenship and Democratic Participation in
Migration Contexts, supra note 102. Another concern is that automatic formal "imposition" of
citizenship title by the country of residence may potentially harm the status of the emigrant in the




Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2011
Shachar
The focus here is on the experience of membership, for which, in the
words of one official report on citizenship, "there can be no substitute."l 34
What jus nexi demands, then, is a closer correlation between democratic
voice, factual membership, and citizenship entitlement. It offers a path for
those whose lives have already become deeply entwined with the bounded
community in which they have settled to enjoy full legal rights and
protections, allowing them to earn the title of full and equal members.'
Having explained how jus nexi operates in theory, I now will provide
concrete examples of the principle at work.
IV. APPLICATION AND INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
We have already witnessed the profound human toll created by the
current stalemate.' 3 6 Instead of raising our arms in despair, however, the
adoption of a jus nexi principle could assist in overcoming the core
objection against earned citizenship: namely, the argument that we must
revert back to an initial act of unlawful admission or overstay as if it
conclusively prohibits the eventual acquisition of legitimate title. This is
not always the case in the domain of private property; nor should it be the
answer when dealing with the public task of allotting entitlement to
citizenship in the political community itself, with the accompanying
protections and obligations of full membership.
A. Undocumented Students: Opening the Golden Door for Members of the
1.5 Generation
The previous sections have emphasized the importance of establishing
links to the political community as the basis for making claims for legal
membership by those who are otherwise barred from admission. These
concerns are particularly evident in regard to young persons who were
brought to the country as children by their parents or guardians in breach
of U.S. immigration laws.
Recognition of this situation has led to repeated attempts to respond to
the hardships faced by individuals like Alan and Juan in the form of
legislation that encapsulates the core idea of rootedness as the basis for
legal title. One such example is found in the DREAM Act,' which
134. See Canada Report of the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration 1994, 12.
135. Note that membership here is not automatically bestowed on the person as in a "jus
domicili" regime. See KOSTAKOPOULOU, supra note 133, at 113-126. Instead, as in naturalization, the
stakeholder resident must apply for citizenship and comply with its requirements. In this, it differs
from the analysis offered by "territorial inclusion" scholars in the context of regularizing unauthorized
immigrants' status. See, e.g., RuBIo-MARIN, supra note 114.
136. See infra text accompanying notes 34-50.
137. The Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act ("DREAM Act") was first
introduced in 2001. DREAM Act, S. 1291, 107th Cong. (2001). It has twice passed the Senate
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consists of several cumulative provisions that would permit
undocumented students to gain conditional permanent resident status if
they arrived in the country before the age of sixteen, have been in the
country continuously for at least five years, and are of good moral
character."' The DREAM Act is designed to overcome the difficult
situation that these individuals face under current immigration law, which
provides them no route to establish citizenship in their new home country
irrespective of how well they fulfill the American dream's mantra of
working hard and tirelessly to realize their talent through merit and effort.
They are the quintessential innocent victims of the stalemate; they had no
knowledge or choice in shaping their parents' decisions to bring them into
the country without legal status. Their only hope to escape an uncertain
future and the fear of deportation depends on resolving the gridlock
between the nation-of-laws and nation-of-immigrants policy perspectives.
Under current immigration law, if a child is brought into the country
undocumented (or falls out of status while in the country), there is no
legal method available to overcome the initial illegality of her entrance if
her parents themselves are not granted legal status. Put differently,
members of the 1.5 generation are ineligible to gain access to American
citizenship by themselves. As long as their parents are in the country
without permission, so, derivatively, and through no fault of their own,
are children who were born outside the United States. The interest in
seeing the DREAM Act pass is therefore not limited to its potential
beneficiaries, individuals like Alan and Juan. The larger political
community, too, has an interest in avoiding the creation of a permanent
underclass of long-term residents who are by definition excluded from
membership, an outcome that would betray the nation's hopes for
Judiciary Committee in bipartisan fashion, by a 16-3 vote in the 108th Congress and again in 2006 by
a voice vote without dissent as an amendment to the comprehensive immigration reform bill. On
October 24, 2007, in a 52-44 vote in the Senate, the DREAM Act, S. 2205, 110th Cong. (2007), fell
just 8 votes shy-with four senators absent for the vote-of the 60 votes necessary to proceed with
debate on the bill. Most recently, the DREAM Act (S. 729 and H.R. 1451) was attached as an
amendment to the National Defense Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 2011, S. 3454, 111th Cong.
(2010), which failed on cloture vote (Sept. 21, 2010). The House then passed the DREAM Act on
Dec. 8, 2010 (216-198), but in a 54-41cloture vote on Dec. 18, 2010, the Senate failed to proceed on
the measure that would have granted a path to citizenship for undocumented migrants who were under
the age of 16 when brought to the United States, have been in the country at least five years, have a
U.S. high school diploma or equivalent and have completed two years of college or military service,
S. 3992) 111th Cong. (2010). In his 2011 State of the Union address, President Obama urged
Congress to work in a bipartisan fashion toward the passage of the DREAM Act: "I know the debate
will be difficult. I know it will take time. But tonight, let's agree to make that effort. And let's stop
expelling talented, responsible young people who could be staffing our research labs or starting new
businesses, who could be further enriching this nation." See Remarks by the President in State of
Union Address (White House, Jan. 25, 2010).
138. The analysis is based on the provisions found in the American Dream Act, S. 729 and H. R.
1751 respectively, Illth Cong. (2009). The DREAM Act of 2010, S. 3827, supra note 139, has
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democratic accountability and the promise of equal opportunity.
The proposed DREAM Act interestingly asks for more than mere
residence and passage of time for individuals to gain citizenship. Instead,
its provisions make the acquisition of permanent membership status
dependent upon the recipients' actual decisions and actions. A young
person applying for adjustment of status would have to demonstrate that
he or she "has been admitted to an institution of higher education in the
United States, or has earned a high school diploma or [equivalent]."' 39
Note the striking language: the Act recognizes that despite the almost
inevitable hardships that undocumented students have endured, they have
managed to earn a diploma. To address the concerns of the nation-of-laws
camp, those seeking to gain the security and opportunity that come with
lawful permanent resident status are asked to contribute to the political
community that now extends a welcoming hand to them. This process of
"giving back" essentially requires the beneficiaries to commit to preparing
themselves for jobs in the 2 1st century economy through education.140
Another, more controversial route to acquire membership, which has
appeared in several versions of the proposed legislation, focuses on
military service for a period of at least two years of service.14 '
Technically, once either path has been pursued--education or military
service-the beneficiary qualifies for having the conditional component
of their adjustment of status removed. In other words, the transition from
an unauthorized migrant who has no right to remain into a lawful
permanent member will be complete.
This structure of conditional status that becomes permanent based upon
the actual behavior of the recipient places emphasis on combined factors
such as the length of residence and age of arrival to the country, as well as
expressions of individual agency and responsibility, thus countering the
"free lunch" argument raised against such a path to earned citizenship by
strict nation-of-laws advocates. 4 2 The DREAM Act offers one way of
139. DREAM Act of 2009, S.729, I lth Cong. § 4(l)(d) (2009).
140. The relevant provisions of the American Dream Act, supra note 140, would require the
completion of a two year program of study at a publicly subsidized community college or equivalent
institution, whereas other proposals, such as the DREAM Act of 2010, supra note 140, only require a
high school diploma.
141. A historical note: The willingness to take arms for the nation and put oneself in harm's way
is perhaps the ultimate, indeed potentially life threatening, indication of a willingness to tie one's
fortunes with that of the admitting nation to which he or she wishes to belong as a full member. It is
also the oldest method for eaming citizenship title, dating back to the solider-warriors of ancient
Greece. In today's reality, there are also more practical reasons for emphasizing military service as a
basis for citizenship, namely, the need to draw new recruits to the fight the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan. This policy is also reflected in the government's decision to fast-track to U.S. citizenship
for immigrants who have served in the armed forces since the 9/11 attacks; this recent changes is
reflected in amendments to sections 328 and 329 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1103, 1440, 1443.
142. The notion of earned citizenship permeates the DREAM Act, as evidenced by the
Congressional Record of the various rounds of frustrated efforts to pass this legislation on Capitol Hill
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trying to put jus nexi into action, illustrating that notions of rootedness
and earned citizenship are already embedded within proposed legislative
solutions. If adopted, this bipartisan initiative would provide access to
membership to undocumented students who, under today's rules, graduate
from high school into the legal limbo of non-membership in the only
country they know as home.143 Members of the 1.5 generation without
doubt represent the most compelling case for applying jus nexi, matching
these individuals' legal realities to social transformations that have
already occurred on the ground and putting right a series of wrongs that
are not of these young people's making. For the generation trapped in the
midst of the nation-of-laws and nation-of-immigrants stalemate, the
rootedness path to earned citizenship offers a "lifeline." 144 It can spell the
difference between a bright future, filled with opportunity, or the grim
reality of a detention center and a pending deportation order. Gaining
access to citizenship under the proposed rootedness principle is not
designed to be effortless or automatic. Nevertheless, it overcomes the core
deficiencies of the present situation by making access to full membership
since 2001. This notion is well captured in the words of Senator Richard J. Durbin, D-Ill:
Almost ten years ago, I introduced this bill called the DREAM Act. The reason I introduced it [as a
bipartisan initiative] was because I felt there was a serious injustice and unfairness going on In
America. We have within our borders thousands of young people who were brought to the United
States by their parents at an early ago. . . . They can here and became part of America. . . . But
because they came to this country with undocumented parents, they were not legal. They couldn't be
citizens.
That, to me, is a serious injustice. We do not, in this country, hold the crimes and misdeeds of parents
against their children. What I have tried to do with the DREAM Act is to give these young people a
chance - a chance to earn their way to legal status and become part of the only country they have ever
known. The DREAM Act isn't easy. The DREAM Act says if you came here as a child, if you were
raised in the United States, are of good moral character, with no criminal record, and you have
graduated from high school, then we give you [a specified number of] years. In that ... period of time,
you have a chance to do one of two things to become legal: No. 1 serve the United States of America;
and No. 2, compete 2 years of a college education. Then we give you a chance to come off temporary
status and become legal in America. But you have to earn your way all the way through, subject to
review, examination, and all the requirements that should be there before someone gets this chance of
a lifetime." See CONG. REC. S7246-S7247 (Sept. 21, 2010) (statement of Sen. Durbin) [emphasis
added].
143. Such a call for change also finds support in the Plyer decision, in which the U.S. Supreme
Court ruled that undocumented children cannot be denied access public schools by the state,
reasoning that these children "can affect neither their parents' conduct nor their own legal status. -
legislation directing the onus of a parent's misconduct against the children does not comport with
fundamental conceptions of justice." See Plyer, 457 U.S., at 220. For those bent on a cost-benefit
analysis, the present situation is objectionable because it means that the communities that have
invested in these students' public education (as required by the Plyer decision) will never fully reap
the benefits of their talents and abilities. Their potential will go unfulfilled and wasted. See Gonzales,
Wasted Talent and Broken Dreams, supra note 34.
144. This term was used by Harvard President Drew Faust to describe the DREAM Act, in a
statement following the detention of Eric Balderas, a sophomore student at Harvard, who was raised
and educated in the United States but had no legal status after having been brought into the country at
the age of four. He was detained for being unlawfully present in the country but later released on
deferred action after his arrest triggered an international outcry. See Xi Yu, Faust, Balderas, Thank
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reflective of human agency and actual behavior, in lieu of the fixed,
predetermined, and irrevocable refusal that is all that the law currently
offers these young people.'4 5 Such denial of opportunity due to
circumstances that are beyond our control (where or to whom we are
born, or under what conditions we are brought into another country at
infancy) goes against basic liberal and democratic notions of fairness and
justice. It punishes children for the deeds of their parents, lacks
proportionality and human compassion, and is blind to processes of
immersion and changed expectations that have already occurred. Instead
of a chance to fulfill the American dream, these young people face
expulsion, uprooting, and life-long banishment from the United States.
Adding a jus nexi route to citizenship offers the most principled and
practical hope for resolving their plight.
B. Unauthorized Migrants: Overcoming the "Original Sin" of Unlawful
Entry
Lawful admission is generally viewed as a necessary step towards the
acquisition of citizenship by those without hereditary membership
entitlement. But what happens if this initial condition of authorized
admission is violated? Perhaps nowhere is the debate between the nation-
of-laws and nation-of-immigrants camps as vexing and contentious as it is
around the question of how to treat long-term resident non-citizens who
have either entered the country as adults in a clandestine fashion or
overstayed a temporary visa.' 46 Unlike children who had no control over
145. European countries, too, have adopted legislative schemes that allow children who arrived at
a young age to gain a residency permit that provides them protection against deportation or removal.
There is also a growing body of jurisprudence developed by the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR) concerning the right to private life under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR). See generally Daniel Thym, Respect for Private and Family Life under Article 8
ECHR in Immigration Cases: A Human Right to Regularize Illegal Stay? 57 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 87
(2008).
146. For different modes of entry of unauthorized migrants living in the United States, see the
statistics by Pew Hispanic Center (Pew Hispanic Center 2006). See also BROOKINGS-DUKE
IMMIGRATION POLICY ROUNDTABLE, BREAKING THE IMMIGRATION STALEMATE: FROM DEEP
DISAGREEMENTS TO CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSALS 4 (2009) [hereinafter BROOKINGS-DUKE]. The
circumstances of admission may prove significant in assessing the government's obligation to
include. As Stephen Legomsky explains: "A slight majority of the twelve million undocumented
immigrants in the United States entered the United States without inspection, therefore committing
misdemeanors. They are 'lawbreakers' by definition. Those who became undocumented by
overstaying lawful temporary visas have not committed criminal acts, but they too have violated the
immigration laws and are subject to removal on that ground. Overstayers, therefore, are also
'lawbreakers."' Stephen H. Legomsky, Portraits of the Undocumented Immigrant: A Dialogue, 44
GA. L. REv. 65, 143-144 (2009). Hiroshi Motomura similarly probes the meaning of unlawful
presence, but from a societal rather than a legalistic perspective, leading him to conclude that "[b]road
tolerance of immigration outside the law prevails today, even if enforcement puts a strong public face
and frequently results in harsh practices that visit severe hardships on the particular migrants who are
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their parents' decision to cross the border, or those who initially followed
the official admission process, the legal status of undocumented adults is
"assumed to be a result of their own, voluntary, action."1 4 7 As such, they
are perceived to be responsible, at least in part, for the predicament they
currently face as "irregular" non-citizens. Yet opinions diverge
significantly about the implications of this initial conduct of unlawful
entry or stay. As legal scholar Linda Bosniak eloquently observes, there is
"a persistent uncertainty about who really is at fault when it comes to
undocumented immigration, and who should properly bear its associated
costs."148
Advocates of the nation-of-laws position have adopted an absolutist
stance in response to this question. They firmly hold that unauthorized
migrants should be barred from admission and denied the rights and
privileges of membership as a result of their "original sin": they broke the
law by entering without permission and must therefore be barred from any
path that could enable them to regularize their status. Some even go a step
further and argue that unauthorized migrants should be deported back to
their countries of origin, irrespective of any hardships that such removal
may cause or the web of relationships that they have established in the
new polity. By contrast, proponents of a nation-of-immigrants vision
emphasize that this country offers its new arrivals the chance of a fresh
beginning. They further quibble with the categorization of undocumented
entrants as "illegal aliens," arguing that, on moral grounds, human beings
cannot be defined as illegal.'49 This sentiment is well captured in slogans
such as "no-one is illegal," or calls for granting "status for all.""so In a
147. See BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN, supra note 33, at 66.
148. Id. at 67 (re-examining the Plyer decision to demonstrate the ambivalence toward
undocumented adults' "culpability"). As the Court wrote: "Sheer incapability or lax enforcement of
the laws barring entry into this country, coupled with the failure to establish an effective bar to the
employment of undocumented aliens, has resulted in the creation of a substantial 'shadow population'
of illegal migrants - numbering in the millions - within our borders. This situation raises the specter
of a permanent caste of undocumented resident aliens, encouraged by some to remain here as a source
of cheap labor, but nevertheless denied the benefits that our society makes available to citizens and
lawful permanent residents." See Plyer, 457 U.S., at 218-219 (footnotes omitted).
149. See Nicholas P. De Genova, Migrant 'Illegality' and Deportability in Everyday Life, 31
ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 419, 420 (2002). See also BENHABIB, THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS, supra
note 25 at 3, 221; Stephen H. Legomsky, supra note 150. As used throughout this Article, the
preferred term is undocumented or unauthorized immigrant. In Mohawk Industries v. Carpenter (No.
08-678), Dec. 8 2009, Justice Sotomayor's opinion marked the first use of the term "undocumented
immigrant," according to a legal database; whereas the term "illegal immigrant" has appeared in a
dozen decisions. See Adam Liptik, Sotomayor Draws Retort from a Fellow Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
9, 2009.
150. See generally No ONE IS ILLEGAL, available at http://www.nooneisillegal.org (last visited
Oct. 31, 2010). See Nicholas P. De Genova, Migrant 'Illegality' and Deportability in Everyday Life,
31 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 419, 420 (2002). See also Stephen H. Legomsky, Portraits of the
Undocumented Immigrant: A Dialogue, 44 GA. L. REv. 65 (2009) at 93; BENHABIB, THE RIGHTS OF
OTHERS, supra note 25 at 3, 221. As used throughout this Article, the preferred term is undocumented
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rebuttal, however, a sophisticated nation-of-laws backer might point out
that it is not the person who is deemed "illegal," but rather the act of
entering the country that was unlawful; a point, which, at least
technically, is valid in a world of regulated migration like our own. In
today's political climate, however, this answer does not stand up to
scrutiny. Consider the fact that lawmakers in the United States passed a
draft of The Border Protection, Anti-Terrorism, and Illegal Immigration
Control Act of 2006 (which in the end was not enacted) that defined
illegal presence in the country as a felony, blurring the line between
action and status, and making unauthorized migration a category of
criminal culpability."' The recent Arizona legislation and copycat
legislation in other states that step up enforcement and focus on
undocumented migrants underscore the tremendously high stakes
involved in this debate.15 2
The difference of opinion and policy between these two competing
camps is, as we have already seen, not easily resolved. Instead of joining
the fray, I again draw upon the conceptual analogy to property law and
explore the operation of several equitable remedies in order to develop the
alternative jus nexi, or rootedness-centered, response to the problem of
initial entry without permission. The exercise is not to find a one-to-one
correlation. Rather, the goal is to respond to the nation of laws' strongest
critique against regularization-that people who entered illegally should
not be afforded an opportunity to adjust their status. Such a position is
overly strict, even in the realm of private property, where the title holder
receives the strongest protection against the rest of the world. We know
from property doctrine that the private property owner may be required,
under specific legal conditions, to give up their rights so that another
person may have similar rights for herself. No similar sacrifice is
requested or justified by the concept of rootedness as the basis for earned
citizenship. For unlike finite resources such as real property (e.g., land),
membership status in the political community is a relational and
Sotomayor's opinion marked the first use of the term "undocumented immigrant," according to a
legal database; whereas the term "illegal immigrant" has appeared in a dozen decisions. See Liptik,
Sotomayor Draws Retort from a Fellow Justice, supra note 153.
151. See The Border Protection, Anti-Terrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005,
H.R. 4437, 109th Cong. (2005). This proposed law would have mandated a felony charge against any
undocumented person found to be residing in the United States, and would have barred undocumented
residents from ever gaining legal status. In other words, unlike the current legal situation, the
proposed Act would have made mere unlawful residence in the United States a federal criminal
offense. It further defined any relative, lawyer, employer, coworkers, clergyman, or friend who in
some way interacted with an undocumented migrant as an "alien smuggler"-cven if they acted
innocently and in good faith, assisting the unauthorized migrant.
152. For background on Arizona's controversial new immigration law (SB 1070), see, for
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government-issued good, a new-property-like intangible, and the granting
of citizenship to person X does not deprive person Y of her entitlement to
full and equal legal membership in the shared political community. When
a path to earned citizenship is granted, the admitting country in effect
restricts its prerogative to deport or remove those whom, despite lacking
legal status, have already become actual members of its economy and
society. A commitment to regularization further entails providing an
earned path of citizenship, as a way to preserve the democratic
accountability of the political community of equals. No less significant,
allowing non-citizens to adjust their status does not displace or deprive
current members of the rights and protections that attach to their
membership entitlement.153 Jus nexi thus avoids the harsher implications
for the original titleholders that may result from the operation of equitable
principles that are found in other areas of the law, including the semi-
sacred realm of property.
Some are surprised to learn that uninvited entrants can, under certain
circumstances, gain legal title to property on which they have settled
without permission. The ancient common-law doctrine of adverse
possession grants title to such possessors who have continuously yet
adversely occupied the land,' 54 for a given period (generally set by
statute, and averaging at around 10 years),"' as if it was their own: "one
who. . . possesses property belonging to another for a sufficient period of
time without the owner's permission acquires title to the property."l 56
Adverse possession thus offers a "startling means of acquiring
property."' 5 Startling because it holds that a person who entered without
permission may obtain full title to the property into which he or she
153. The addition of new legal members may affect, however, the distribution of the associated
benefits, such as access to social benefits, public education or health care that are understood by
political economists as potentially rivalry, whereby the consumption by one person can be seen as
diminishing entitlement for another. The actual tally depends on the aggregate balance sheet of
contribution to public resources versus usage of such services. There is no consensus on the basic
matrix, let alone results, of such complex social public policy calculations.
154. Importantly, when thinking about earned citizenship as an equitable remedy in the
immigration context, the requirements of adverse possession would have to be fulfilled collectively
rather than measured individually. For instance, countless reports document the presence of an
estimated population of 11 to 12 million undocumented migrants on American soil, and this evidence
would suffice to establish the requirements of "open and notorious" occupancy. See, e.g.,
BROOKINGS-DUKE, supra note 150, at 9. In this public fashion, a constructive notice has been given
and the presence can be deemed hostile in the legal sense of occupation of the land (most states do not
require an intent component for the limitation period to begin to click). It is also actual, open,
continuous and notorious as evidenced by the long-term physical presence of these very large
numbers of undocumented migrants residing on the territory.
155. See infra note 159.
156. SINGER, ENTITLEMENT, supra note 56, at 45. See also THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E.
SMITH, PROPERTY 35 (2010).
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initially entered unlawfully.' 5  To establish lawful title in this way,
however, certain conditions must apply. The most significant of them is
that the entrant must have resided on the territory in actual possession for
an extended period of time. The precise period of continued occupancy in
actual possession in the context of property differs from one jurisdiction
to another. 5 9
Regardless of the specific period of occupancy applied, the effect of the
doctrine of adverse possession remains the same: it dramatically limits
owners' rights to exclude outsiders if they take no action after actual or
constructive notice that an uninvited occupant has visibly resided on their
territory for a long time. Under such circumstances, the law of property
recognizes that relationships and expectations may change over time.
Another illuminating angle on adverse possession is provided by Joseph
Singer, who argues that once "both parties have acted in ways
inconsistent with the formal property rights," it is unfair to turn against
the adverse possessor armed with the formalities of title.16 0 Instead, we
can understand the parties' acquiescence in their informal arrangements as
effectively creating an "informal transfer" of entitlement.'' The right of
the entrant to acquire title through adverse possession is not automatic; it
is treated as a remedy that becomes operable only after the statute of
limitations for recovery has expired. This legal protection guards the
interests of the "true" owner as against the uninvited occupant,
manifesting the right to exclude. This by itself is not unexpected. What is
surprising, and radically so, is that once that period of time has passed
(i.e., once the statute of limitations for recovery has expired), the original
owner is barred from removing the adverse possessor from the property-
despite the fact that the owner never granted permission for such entry in
the first place.
If this kind of a restriction operates in the context of real property,
where we are dealing with private owners who typically have a strong
claim to their rights in rem, then it arguably applies at least with equal
force when dealing with a public entitlement such as citizenship. We can
think here of the adverse possession example as methodologically
representing the "most difficult case": if it can be proven that such
158. HERBERT HOVENKAMP & SHELDON F. KURTZ, THE LAW OF PROPERTY: AN INTRODUCTORY
SURVEY 55 (5th ed. 2001).
159. For example, the required period is 7 years in Florida, 15 Years in Connecticut, 5 years in
California, 10 years in Ontario, 10 years in Alberta, and 12 years in the UK for unregistered land. See,
e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 325 (West 2010); CONN. GEN STAT. § 52 -575 (West 2009); FLA. STAT.
§95.16-18 (2010); Sherren v. Pearson, 14 S.C.R. 581 (1887) (Can.); Lundrigans Ltd. v. Prosper, 132
D.L.R. 3d. 727 (1981) (Can); Real Property Limitations Act R.S.O., c. L.15, s. 4 (1990) (Can.);
Limitations Act, R.S.A. c.L-12, sub 3(1) (2000) (Can.); Limitation Act, c.58, § 15 (1980) (Eng.).
160. SINGER, ENTITLEMENT, supra note 56, at 46 (emphasis added).
161. Id. at 46.
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equitable remedies apply in the highly-protected realm of property, then
the argument in favor of creating a legal route for regularization in the
context of citizenship becomes easier to establish and justify.6 2 Recall
that political membership is bestowed by an act of the sovereign, thus
bearing more stringent requirements of public accountability,
responsibility, and an obligation to include. Arguably, if the government
(operating here as a "trustee" for the political community) has tacitly
deferred to the peaceful, productive and continuous residence by millions
of unauthorized migrants who have settled within its territory for an
extended period, then there must be a point in time when it is estopped by
its own inaction.163 In such circumstances, the unauthorized entrants
ought to gain certain immunity from deportation and removal, in addition
to being offered an eventual route to regularizing their status. As we saw
earlier, such an "obligation to include" in the American context (to draw
on Smith's terminology) also stems from democratic theory in general
and this country's history in particular.
Critically, the obligation to include also is informed by the familiar
legal distinction-in property and citizenship law-between initial entry,
which any state is permitted to regulate, and the subsequent decision of
how to treat long-term settled non-citizens who already reside on the
territory, participate in its society and economy, and are subject to the
effects of the nation's coercive legal authority. The nation-of-laws
position consistently blurs the latter with the former, as if the initial
admission must ultimately and unarguably control the so-called "second
admission."" This locks undocumented immigrants residing in the
country into "an inferior position that is also an anomalous situation." As
philosopher Michael Walzer observes, they are "outcasts in a society that
has no caste norms, metics [resident aliens barred from membership in
ancient Greece] in a society where metics have no comprehensible,
protected, and dignified place."I The denial of a legal path to citizenship
for this long-settled population relies on a failure to recognize any and all
ties or connections established after the initial entry. The consequences of
such a policy are potentially far reaching not only for the undocumented
migrants but for the receiving society as well. For, as Walzer tellingly
asserts, if we persistently disallow those who are living among us, those
who "do socially necessary work, and are deeply enmeshed in the legal
162. See Ran Hirschl, The Question of Case Selection in Comparative Constitutional Law, 53
Am. J. CoMP. L. 125 (2005) (explaining the logic and use of the "most difficult case" methodology).
163. There is no technical difficulty in envisioning such an option. We saw earlier that the
government's power to remove aliens was in the past restricted by a statute of limitation that applied
to deportation. See supra notes I16-118 and the accompanying text.
164. See WALZER, supra note 33, at 59 (distinguishing between initial entry and second
admission); HAMMAR, supra note 98 (identifying different "entry gates" on the road to membership).
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system of the country to which they have come,"l6 an option to become
equal members, we run the risk, as he puts it, of becoming a band of
citizen-tyrants. 16 7
These moral and political considerations are important. So is the
recognition that equitable remedies-from laches to statutes of limitations
to estoppels-have long been part of our conception of the rule of law,
providing a response in equity that supplements strict legal directives
where the latter's application would operate harshly or produce unjust
results.' 6 ' Equitable remedies typically involve injunctions or decrees,
rather than monetary awards or damages, devoting significant attention to
the actual conduct, actions, statements, admissions, failures to act, or
acquiescence of the parties. Estoppel, for example, explores the conduct
of the person, and based on that conduct, as Lord Denning memorably put
it, "[s]omeone is stopped from saying something or other, or doing
something or other, or contesting something or other."1 69 Statutes of
limitations define specific time limits for legal action to be undertaken;
the doctrine of laches operates in a roughly similar manner, although no
pre-proscribed periods are defined.' In each of these instances, the
consequences are serious; they can bar or prejudice the party that failed to
assert a right or a claim within a "proper" time framework.
Unlike the absolutist claim of the nation-of-laws, holding that the law
does not permit alterations to one's status and situation based on the
combination of conduct and passage of time, there is a wide range of
equitable remedies that do just that. Instead of fixating legal analysis only
on the initial moment in time, equitable principles supplement and
respond to the effect of use, time lapse, and actual conduct, with the
potential to alter the rights and obligations of related parties. This
counters the image of an unforgiveable "original sin" (here, overstaying a
temporary visa or entering into the country without authorization) that is
dear to many who resist the idea of providing a regulated path to earned
citizenship. Their claim is that nothing can overturn or mitigate the initial
breach of the country's immigration law, which is, nonetheless, a civil
(not a criminal) public statute. Yet examples drawn from different fields
166. Id. at 60.
167. Id at 58.
168. See generally FREDERIC P. MILLER ET. AL, EQUITY (2010).
169. Mcllkenny v. Chief Constable of West Midlands (1980) 1 Q.B. 283, 317 (CA, Eng.).
170. This raises a host of complex legal questions in the citizenship context. For instance, is lax
enforcement of immigration law by the government at the external border or in the interior analogous
to not taking action within a prescribed period prior to the expiry of a statute of limitation? Can it,
therefore, not be held against the applicant seeking earned membership? The exact answers and
considerations to take in to account would have to be either settled generally through legislation as
part of the carving out of a compromise between the nation of laws and nation of immigrants, or left
to a case-by-case analysis by administrative tribunals.
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of private and public law demonstrate that painstaking consideration is
paid to changed factors and expectations that evolve over time, sometimes
even ripening to legal title. This is crucial for our argument, for it offers a
legally and historically established counter to the "absolute dominion"
stance proclaimed by the hardliners of the nation-of-laws camp.
The doctrine of adverse possession, as we have just seen, represents an
extreme illustration of this pattern at work, countering the formalistic
claim that we must always refer back to the initial point in time. Although
the current American approach emphasizes instrumental considerations to
reject this position (e.g., encouraging efficient takeovers from absentee
title holders, respecting the expectations of third parties who have relied
on appearances),17 1 other common law jurisdictions, most notably
England, have taken a more procedural approach, focusing on the
technical aspects of possession and the passage of time. 1 72 As Larissa
Katz observes, the English approach is concerned primarily with whether
the original owner has failed to act on her rights within the statute of
limitations period: "Nothing more is needed: no intent to own, no conflict
with the owner, no 'adversity,' in other words."' 7 1 In contemplating the
idea of overcoming the initial act of unauthorized entry in the context of
immigration law by way of peaceful, productive, and continuous
residence in the country, there is an advantage to following in the
footsteps of the English model because of its highly procedural nature.
Under this scheme, a person's actual conduct and her compliance with a
statutory relief structure would play a key role toward fulfilling the
requirements of earned citizenship.
What makes the rootedness logic particularly compelling for our
discussion is the fact that it cannot be easily dismissed as insignificant or
implausible as a remedy. It has been part of legal theory and doctrine for
centuries, dating back to the earliest days of the English common law. If
the "original sin" of unlawful admission can be forgiven in the context of
property, where the titleholder is presumed to have "sole and despotic
dominion . . . in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the
universe"-to evoke Blackstone's magisterial words-then surely a
similar logic can apply with equal force to the relations between
democratic governments and those who have already established long-
term and productive residence in their prosperous territories. This permits
a way to finally dismantle the gridlock by providing a foundation for
171. See. e.g., Richard A. Epstein, One Step Beyond Nozick's Miminal State: The Role of Forced
Exchanges in Political Theory, 22 SOC. PHIL. & POLICY 286 (2005); Lee Anne Fennel, Efficient
Trespass: The Case for 'Bad Faith'Adverse Possession, 100 Nw. U.L.REV. 1037 (2006); Thomas W.
Merrill, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession, 79 Nw. U.L.REv 1122 (1985).
172. See Larissa Katz, The Moral Paradox of Adverse Possession Resolved: Sovereignty and
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reform that can appeal not only to those in the nation-of-immigrants
camp, but also to adherents of the nation-of-laws position, especially
given that in the context of citizenship the inclusion of newcomers does
not dispossess the existing participants or titleholders of their rights and
protections.
As with the argument from democratic inclusion, the acquisition of
earned membership status would not be open to anyone; happenstance
presence in the country, for example, would not qualify a person for the
relief of earned citizenship. Ultimately, it is not the mere act of entering
into the territory that counts. Rather, "the ties that non-citizens develop
over time" are what matter.'74 This fits flawlessly with the logic ofjus
nexi, providing a remedy only after expectations to stay have been
established-a process that requires settlement and the passage of a
significant amount of time. According to the citizenship and immigration
laws of the vast majority of the world's countries, a predefined minimum
residence period must be fulfilled for a waiver to become a relevant
option.' 7 1 The time period is typically referred to as "not less than five
years," a baseline benchmark that is already familiar to us from the
American naturalization context.' 76 Here, however, this benchmark period
refers to the time of residence out of status, after which a temporary or
permanent relief can be granted.'7 7 Unlike the more extreme positions
held by some on the nation-of-immigrants camp,17 8 jus nexi would not
grant almost automatic relief to anyone who managed to cross the border.
Rather, it would permit regularizing the status of long-term non-citizen
residents who have, in effect, "taken root" in the community and whose
continued presence in the country was, as the case law has it, "generally
known and talked of by the public."1 79
174. See Motomura, We Askedfor Workers, supra note 96, at 246.
175. See, e.g., Patrick Weil, Access to Citizenship: A Comparison of Twenty-Five Nationality
Laws, in CITIZENSHIP TODAY: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES AND PRACTICES 17-35 (T. Alexander
Aleinikoff & Douglas Klusmeyer, eds., 2001); ACQUISITION AND Loss OF NATIONALITY: POLICIES
AND TRENDS IN 15 EUROPEAN STATES (Rainer Baubock et al. eds., 2006).
176. See supra notes 124-127. Comparatively, the conditions and periods of residence for
naturalization still differ per country; this implies that so will the benchmark periods for regularizing
status, which will have to comply with each country's overall membership regime.
177. In the United States the period would likely rise to seven years to fit with the historical
precedent of waivers from deportation, or cancelation of removal provisions, that are traced back to
the Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, §fl 3, 7th proviso, 39 Stat. 874, 878 (Feb. 5, 1917).). On the
historical background, see MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING
OF MODERN AMERICA 84-88 (2004).
178. See, e.g., KEVIN R. JOHNSON, OPENING THE FLOODGATES: WHY AMERICA NEEDS TO
RETHINK ITS BORDERS AND IMMIGRATION LAWS (2007).
179. See Adams v. Slattery, 295 SW 2d 859 (Tex. 1956). Interestingly, the 2006 Comprehensive
Immigration Reform bill reflected just this notion: it envisioned an ascending scale that was sensitive
to individualized factors. For instance, two to five years of residency were generally seen as providing
a weaker claim for establishing a conditional status, in comparison with the situation of those who
have already resided in the country for at least five years. People with less than two years of residence
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Under current immigration law, none of these real, continuous, and
genuine links to the country matter, with the narrow exception of
individualized discretionary remedies.s 0 It is the initial moment of
unlawful entry alone that counts for setting up the general legal policy,
making those who have entered without permission or overstayed their
visas members of an underclass that lives alongside, but not in the legal
company of, citizens. They are settled residents who are by definition
excluded from membership. Unauthorized migrants are often aware of the
legislative debates around plans to introduce an earned path to citizenship.
As one of them put it: "They could change the law like that . .. You start
with a permit to work, and then if don't get in any trouble, they give the
citizenship to stay here and go in and out of America legally."' 8 ' Yet,
"[t]here are a lot of people who don't like us to be here, but the thing is,
we are here." 82
The last factor is crucial. As a recent non-partisan immigration policy
roundtable report states:
The best estimates suggest that approximately 11.9 million
immigrants are in the United States illegally. Some of these
individuals have been here for many years with steady employment
histories and roots in local communities. Their continued presence is
a result of our failures to devise and implement effective
immigration policies. These individuals are also here, however,
because of choices they made and chances they took to live here
without papers. So what do we do now?
Even if sending 12 million people home were feasible, it would a
catastrophic choice-enormously expensive, diplomatically
disastrous, and hugely costly in human terms. Neighborhoods would
be torn apart, families would be separated, and a new and sorry
chapter in American race relations would be written.'83
Rootedness offers a brighter future. It permits a forward-looking
exoneration as dictated by the narrative of a welcoming nation of
immigrants. Still, we need to adequately address the nation-of-laws claim
that there are strong principled and prudential considerations that favor
signaling disapproval with the initial unlawful entry or visa overstay. All
the major legislative proposals for comprehensive immigration reform in
recent years have acknowledged this concern. This finds expression in the
were assumed to have not yet "taken root," barring extreme hardship cases that would provoke
discretionary relief.
180. See supra notes 104-108, 115 and accompanying text.
181. Immigrant X, My Life as an Illegal, TEXAS MONTHLY 102 (July 2006).
182. Id.
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demand to enforce tougher border controls prospectively while
retrospectively imposing mandatory fines on the beneficiaries of any such
earned-citizenship legalization. These are often conceptualized as
"redemption dues" owed to the admitting society, recognizing the initial
illegality of entry as the nation-of-laws view commands.' 84 As Stephen
Legomsky pointedly observes, placing a fine of several thousand dollars
on low-income immigrant families is anything but trivial; "it's a serious
punishment," but it holds the promise of a new beginning.' What is
more, because nothing is swept under the rug, legalization of this kind
expresses the view that once the person has been publicly reprimanded, it
is possible to overcome "previous transgression[s]" and to "start again
with a clean slate." 8 6
Other concerns still remain. If we think of membership as a new
property-like title issued and governed exclusively by the state, those who
have acquired permission to remain may nevertheless be rightly asked to
fulfill a condition that demands "moving back to the end of the line"
before permanent status can be established.'"8 As the late Senator Edward
M. Kennedy elucidated:
What we are talking about in this program is recognizing that people
who have violated the law are able to work and earn their way into a
position where eventually they can apply for citizenship if they pay a
penalty, if they demonstrate they have paid their back taxes, and they
are prepared to learn English. After the last person in line
legitimately is able to gain entry into the United States, they can
adjust their status.
The last point is important. Any legalization program must protect and
respect the interests of lawful immigrants and applicants who have
followed the queue. Clearly, they should not be disadvantaged or asked to
bear the brunt of any regularization process affecting those who entered
without permission.' There are two possible solutions here: first, since
long-term undocumented residents are already part and parcel of the
184. Legomsky, supra note 150 at 94. See George W. Bush, Pres. Messages, 109th Cong., 2nd
Sess., 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N. D60, at 3-4 ("I believe that illegal aliens who have roots in our country and
want to stay should have to pay a meaningful penalty for breaking the law, to pay their taxes, to learn
English, and to work in a job for a number of years. People who meet these conditions should be able
to.apply for citizenship, but approval will not be automatic and they will have to wait in line behind
those who played by the rules and followed the law. What I've just described is not amnesty. . .)
185. See BROOKINGS-DUKE, supra note 150.
186. Id. See also Papademetriou, The 'Regularization' Option, supra note 115, at 6.
187. See George W. Bush Pres. Messages, supra note 185.
188. These considerations are particularly acute when dealing with a large-scale legalization
scheme, as is the case in the present U.S. debate. Similar measures have been taken in France (1980-
1981), Italy (2002, 2009), Spain, (2005). See Papademetriou, supra note 115, at 2, 7; Weil, All or
Nothing,supra note 117, at 10-11.
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actual society and economy, special provisions could be made through
legislation to increase the number of allotted lawful permanent residence
permits for the fixed legalization period. This would not create a larger
"wave" of new immigrants because those entitled to benefit from the jus
nexi principle are by definition residents that already live here (although
without legal status) and, in most cases, have lived here for a long time.
Second, and more plausibly, the solution of moving to the back of the line
can be fulfilled by granting a temporary status to those who qualify
according to the rootedness principle.'8 9 This would eventually be
upgraded to a green card (or permanent residence status) for those who
wish to apply for it.'90 This structure of gradual and growing inclusion
into the circle of members (from temporary or conditional status to
permanent residence) is familiar. We already explored this structure in our
discussion of the DREAM Act. Likewise, it is applied as a matter of
course to various classes of entrants in contemporary US immigration
law, from finances to spouses to investor category entrants. 191
Moving beyond reasons of pure compassion and humanitarian
considerations that are abundant amongst nation-of-immigrants advocates
(in themselves providing powerful and sufficiently compelling platforms
for reform action), the jus nexi framework developed here enables us to
engage in conversation with, and ideally convince, those who otherwise
189. Such a structure is prevalent in regularization schemes in European countries, where the
once-undocumented receive a temporary and often renewable permit to stay and work lawfully. See
Papademetriou, supra note 115, at 7. Variations remain, however. France, for example, has
established a route for earned citizenship that is based on proof of strong links to the country by
undocumented migrants who have lived on its territory for at least ten years, although the grant of
status is subject to the discretionary exercise of authority. See Weil, All or Nothing, supra note 117, at
12. Finland and Denmark have incorporated a "sliding scale principle" that holds that the longer the
period of residence, the stronger the claim for protection against deportation or removal. See
KOSTAKOPOULOU, supra note 133. These various mechanisms are in line with the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR) jurisprudence interpreting Article 8 of the ECHR which affirms the right to
private and family life. See, e.g., Djeroud v. France, Application No. 13446/87, 14 European Human
Rights Reports 68 (1992); Beldjoudi v. France, 234 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1992); Silvenko v. Latvia,
10 Eur. Ct. H.R. 229 (2003); Maslov v. Austaria, Application No. 1683/03 (unreported, Eur. Ct. H.R.,
Grand Chamber, June 23, 2008). For an overview, see Daniel Thym, Respect for Private and Family
Life under Article 8 ECHR in Immigration Cases: A Human Right to Regularize Illegal Stay? 57
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 87 (2008).
190. The period of required post-adjustment residence might range anywhere from five to seven
years, based on comparative and past practice. See supra note 178. Those seeking to remain would be
to subject to standard background checks and related immigration law requirements just like any other
applicant. Some proposals advocate the introduction of a credit or point system in order to formalize
the criteria for earned citizenship. See, e.g., Papademetriou, supra note 115, at 8, 11-14. Such detailed
blueprints go beyond the scope of this discussion which has focused on the rationale for the adoption
of a new jus nexi principle, showing how the notion of rootedness is already embedded within
proposed solutions to the immigration stalemate.
191. This structure of a temporary status that can later be adjusted to a permanent status is found
in various contexts of America's immigration regime: from the k-visa provisions for fiancas, the two
years conditional status for immigrants seeking permanent residence based on a marriage relationship
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declare that the host country should never authorize a reform that permits
a benefit to those whose first entry into its territory broke the law. Here,
the best answer is to turn to the rootedness narrative of earned citizenship.
If "regularizing" title and allowing access to the benefits of protected
status is permitted in the ultra-protective context of property law, where
there is only so much land and the new owner displaces the former, then
the weaker claim defended in this Article-namely, providing a path to
legal citizenship to those who have already become social members,
without dislocating the membership status of prior titleholders-can be
powerfully vindicated.
V. CONCLUSION
To be sure, the adoption of the rootedness framework would not offer a
full resolution to the intense nation-of-laws versus nation-of-immigrants
debate. It is part of a larger renegotiation of the borders and boundaries of
membership in the twenty-first century.' 92 These changes are taking place
already, reversing many years of relatively lax immigration enforcement
that arguably contributed to, or at least turned a blind eye to, the presence
of a huge population of undocumented migrants in the United States. In
the post-9/11 era, the argument for legalization also finds support from
various regulatory and law-and-order agencies at the national, state, and
local levels. 193 This reflects a "seeing like a state" preference to dealing
with registered and visible citizens in lieu of an underground or shadow
population that is not part of official counts and emergency contingency
planning, a situation that is generally not healthy for any democratic, rule
of law society.194
These prevailing considerations point in the same direction, bringing us
back to Holmes: "when the roots have grown to a certain size, [they]
cannot be displaced without cutting at [the person's] life."'" For the long-
term residents present in the country without papers, the focus on taking
root as captured by the proposed jus nexi principle offers an equitable
remedy and lifeline where standard routes to citizenship prove foreclosed.
This is where the lessons of property theory and practice prove most
helpful. As we saw earlier, part of the explanation for upholding adverse
192. Such a reform would also likely require those on the nation-of-immigrants side to make
concessions, such as accepting the nation-of-laws' demand of greater enforcement of border control
and stepped-up labor sanctions, possibly including tighter employment and employee identification
and verification systems. For an illuminating overview, see Benjamin Marquez & John F. Witte,
Immigration Reform: Strategies for Legislative Action, 7 FORUM, tab. 1 (2009)
193. See Papademetriou, supra note 115, at 6, 12.
194. JAMES C. Scorr, SEEING LIKE A STATE: How CERTAIN SCHEMES TO IMPROVE THE HUMAN
CONDITION FAILED (1998).
195. THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 17.
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possession's unusual method of acquiring title is that although legal
formalities matter greatly in defining title, so does the lived experience
that constitutes this Article's vision of rootedness. Such a comprehensive
approach to understanding the distribution of entitlements fits perfectly
with the jus nexi rationale.
In this Article, I have recommended the adoption of a jus nexi, or
rootedness, principle as a route to earned citizenship open to those who
cannot claim access to membership based on the traditional jus soli and
jus sanguinis tenets of citizenship law. This proposed genuine-connection
principle offers a more nuanced and grounded way in which to address
the question of boundary-making, based as it is on actual membership and
social attachment rather than mere reliance on the lottery of birthright
entitlement or the "original sin" of the unlawfulness of entry. I have
supported this proposal by looking to legal and moral rationales
previously used to justify the earning of legitimate title in the context of
private property by those who initially entered without permission. I also
have emphasized that these responses recognize the web of relations and
expectations informing the social fact of membership. This in turn permits
greater democratic accountability, given that all those who reside in the
jurisdiction and are regularly affected by the state's authority and coercive
legal powers gain the right not to be excluded, and with it, gain a hand in
shaping and deploying its participatory self-governance.
In creating a closer tie between actual membership and access to
permanent residence status, the rootedness framework permits us to draw
upon concepts of ascending scales of title acquisition; it also sheds light
upon the possibility of regularizing the status of unauthorized migrants
based on the unexpected and surprising source of the oldest and most
persistent property doctrine: adverse possession. These insights, along
with changing definitions of membership at both the local and
international levels, have informed the defense of thejus nexi principle as
a way to overcome the stalemate between the nation-of-laws and nation-
of-immigration camps. It is time to offer an equitable path to earned
citizenship for those who currently remain forever titleless, excluded from
the circle of members. The new rootedness framework is the way forward,
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